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THE FAMILY VIEWING HOUR:
AN ASSAULT ON THE
FIRST AMENDMENT?
By Andrea Jane Grefe*
Introduction
In 1975 ninety-seven percent of all American households owned televi-
sion sets.' It is estimated that the average television set stays turned on
almost six hours per day.2 By the time an average American child is old
enough to enter the first grade, she will already have spent more hours in
front of the television set than she will spend in a college classroom earning
a bachelor's degree.3 By age eighteen that child will have spent more time
watching television than doing anything else except sleeping.4 An average
high school graduate will have spent nearly twice as much time in front of
the television set as was spent attending school.5 During that time she will
have been exposed to an estimated 350,000 commercials and 18,000 mur-
ders. 6 Child psychologist Robert M. Liebert states that television "has
changed childhood more than any other social innovation in the history of
the world." 7 According to David Pearl, the head of the behavioral sciences
research branch of the National Institute of Mental Health, "television is the
socializing agency" for the majority of children in the country. 8
The impact of television and, more specifically, the effect of scenes of
sex and violence broadcast on television, has become the subject of public
debate, psychological studies, congressional hearings, newspaper and mag-
© Andrea Jane Grefe, 1977.
* Member, third-year class.
1. Broadcasting Yearbook 1976 at C-300.
2. See Reed, The Psychological Impact of TV Advertising and the Need for FTC Regula-
tion, 13 AM. Bus. L.J. 171 (1975).
3. N. JOHNSON, How To TALK BACK TO YOUR TV SET 11 (1970).
4. Lublin, The Television Era: From Bugs to Batman, Children's TV Shows Produce
Adult Anxiety, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 37, col. 1.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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azine articles, and television commentary. 9 In an attempt to meet mounting
public criticism, as well as pressure from Congress and the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC), the National Association of Broadcasters
(NAB) 1° adopted the Family Viewing Hour (FVH)'1 policy as an amend-
ment to the NAB Television Code.12 The purpose of the FVH policy was to
9. The issue of televised sex and violence has a twenty-five year history of attention by
Congress, the FCC, and commentators. See generally Violence on Television: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974); Review of Policy Matters of Federal Communications Commission and Inquiry into
Crime and Violence on Television and a Proposed Study Thereof by the Surgeon General:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 91, pt. 6 (1969); Investigation of Juvenile Delinquency in the United States:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 16 (1964); Investigation of Juvenile Delinquency in the
United States: Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 10 (1961-62); Investigation of Juvenile
Delinquency in the United States: Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delin-
quency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) and 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1954); FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, CHILDREN'S TELEVISION REPORT AND
POLICY STATEMENT, 50 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974); FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, EN BANC
PROGRAMMING INQUIRY, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960); Barrow, Private Interests, in FREEDOM AND
RESPONSIBILITY IN BROADCASTING 53, 66 (J. Coons ed. 1961); Jaffe, The Role of Government, in
FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY IN BROADCASTING 35, 37 (J. Coons ed. 1961); Minow, The Public
Interest, in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY IN BROADCASTING 15, 31 (J. Coons ed. 1961); Barrow,
The Attainment of Balanced Program Service in Television, 52 VA. L. REV. 633, 636-38 (1966).
"Broadcasters [have] responded to these concerns in a variety of ways. Attempts were
made to reduce gratuitous violence, to schedule particularly violent programs in later hours of
the evening, and to use advisories alerting audiences to the presence of disturbing material.
These policies were employed as factors in the decisionmaking process rather than as hard and
fast rules. They were serious considerations in broadcaster decisionmaking, but were by no
means uniformly followed. Many of the broadcasters provided evidence of the fact that
broadcasters have used violence as an easy way to raise ratings." Writers Guild of America,
West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1094-95 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
10. The NAB was organized in 1923 as a voluntary organization of television and radio
stations. NAB membership is comprised of approximately 1000 radio and 410 television stations
of which approximately 388 are network owned or affiliated. Complaint at 10, Writers Guild of
America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
11. The FVH Amendment was adopted in April 1975 at the NAB's annual convention and
provides in part:
"[E]ntertainment programming inappropriate for viewing by a general family audience should
not be broadcast during the first hour of network entertainment programming in prime time and
in the immediate preceding hour. In the occasional case when an entertainment program in this
time period is deemed to be inapproporiate for such an audience, advisories should be used to
alert viewers. Advisories should also be used when programs in later prime time periods contain
material that might be disturbing to significant segments of the audience." NATIONAL ASSOCIA-
TION OF BROADCASTERS, THE TELEVISION CODE 2-3 (18th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as TELEVI-
SION CODE].
12. Id. at 21. Subscription to the Code has traditionally been voluntary. Any individual or
corporation operating a television station or network is eligible to subscribe even if they do not
hold membership in the NAB. Independent production and distribution companies may also
subscribe to the Code. Since the three networks, American Broadcasting Companies (ABC),
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), and the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) sub-
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prohibit the broadcasting of sex and violence during the hours of 7:00 to
9:00 p.m. 13 All programs broadcast during those two hours were required to
be appropriate for general family viewing.14
In October 1975 the Writers Guild of America, the Directors Guild of
America, the Screen Actors Guild, and a number of independent creators,
writers, and producers 15 filed a lawsuit against the three major television
networks (ABC, NBC, and CBS), the NAB, the FCC, and the FCC
commissioners. 16 In a companion suit, 17 Tandem Productions sought
$10,000,000 in damages because "All In The Family" was allegedly
moved out of its 8:00 p.m. time slot due to the FVH policy. 18 Although the
defendants characterized the FVH policy as the result of self-regulation by
the networks, the plaintiffs attacked the policy as a violation of the First
Amendment. 19
The opinion handed down in Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v.
FCC20 focused on the actions taken both by FCC Chairman Wiley and the
full Commission that were found to constitute state action and to compro-
mise licensee independence in violation of the First Amendment. The purpose
of this note is to review those portions of the FVH opinion pertaining to the
doctrines of state action, prior restraints, vagueness, and overbreadth. Part I
presents an overview of the historical development of broadcast regulation,
with an emphasis on the unique aspects of broadcasting that complicate a
First Amendment analysis. Part II presents a summary of the FVH litigation
by reviewing the factual findings, the legal liability flowing from these
findings, and the available remedies. Part m analyzes the doctrines of state
scribe, the programming supplied by them to their affiliates is presumed to comply with the
Code. In January 1974 the NAB Television Board of Directors decided to require all NAB
members to subscribe to the Code by April 1976 as a condition of membership in the NAB.
Despite a threatened exodus from the NAB, in January 1975 the NAB Board reaffirmed the
adoption of mandatory Code membership. Note, The Limits of Broadcast Self-Regulation
Under the First Amendment, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1527, 1530 & n. 16 (1975), reprinted with revisions
in 28 FED. COMM. B.J. 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Broadcast Self-Regulation].
13. See TELEVISION CODE, supra note 11.
14. Id.
15. Most notable of the independent producer plaintiffs was Norman Lear, producer of
"All In The Family." Other plaintiffs included: Danny Arnold, Allan Bums, Samuel Denoff,
Larry Gelbart, Susan Harris, Willian Persby, Paul Witt, and Edwin Weinberger. The shows in
which these plaintiffs were involved included "All In The Family," "Phyllis," "The Mary
Tyler Moore Show," "Barney Miller," ".M*A*S*H," "Rhoda," and "Fay." Writers Guild of
America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1072 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Writers Guild Complaint
at 1-4. See also note 75 infra.
16. Writers Guild Complaint at 1-4.
17. Tandem Productions, Inc. v. CBS, was consolidated with Writers Guild of America,
West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
18. Tandem Complaint at 9.
19. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech .... U.S.
CoNsT. amend. I.
20. 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
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action, prior restraints, vagueness, and overbreadth by reviewing the appli-
cable law and applying it to the facts of the FVH case. Although the court
found a First Amendment violation based on state action, this note con-
cludes that the court could also have found that the FVH policy was an
impermissible prior restraint of protected speech and that the policy was
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
I. Historical Development of Broadcast Regulation
The unique characteristics of broadcasting have traditionally neces-
sitated some differences in the application of First Amendment standards. It
is useful, therefore, to examine the historical development of broadcast
regulation before exploring the issues that arose in the FVH litigation.
Present day television broadcast regulation developed from early regu-
lation of the radio industry. Due to the nature of radio waves and the
phenomenon known as "interference," 21 frequency control and regulation
were necessary even in the early stages of broadcasting. 22 Congress respond-
ed to this need by enacting the Radio Act of 1912.23 This attempted
regulation was, however, ineffectual. Although the then Secretary of Com-
merce and Labor, Herbert Hoover, who was entrusted with regulation under
the Act, believed he had the power to regulate and control radio frequencies,
it was subsequently held in United States v. Zenith Radio Corporation24
that such power was not inherent in the act. 25 The Zenith decision seems to
have established that although the Secretary of Commerce and Labor was
required to issue a license for the operation of the defendant's station, he had
not been granted any statutory authority to regulate the frequency and hours
of station operation.2 6 As a result, it was entirely "possible for several
broadcasters to transmit on the same frequency at the same time, resulting
in both poor quality transmission and reception." 27 During the 1920's over
two hundred new stations came on the air, using any frequency and any
power that they desired.28 This rapid and chaotic radio boom caused Hoover
21. "Interference is the phenomenom whereby waves of the same or related frequencies
overlap, causing distorted radio transmissions." Note, "Public Interest, " "Fairness, " and the
First Amendment: A Broadcaster's Dilemma, 4 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 509, 509 n.5 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as A Broadcaster's Dilemma).
22. Id. at 509.
23. Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302 (1912). For historical information surrounding
this Act, see generally Metzger & Burrus, Radio Frequency Allocation in the Public Interest:
Federal Government and Civilian Use, 4 DUQ. U.L. REV. 1, 3-7 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Radio Frequency Allocation].
24. 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Il. 1926).
25. Id. at 618; A Broadcaster's Dilemma, supra note 21, at 509.
26. See United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 617-18 (N.D. Il1. 1926); A
Broadcaster's Dilemma, supra note 21, at 510. See also F. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD Guys, THE
BAD GUYS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 16 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FRIENDLY].
27. A Broadcaster's Dilemma, supra note 21, at 510 (emphasis added).
28. FRIENDLY, supra note 26, at 16.
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to advocate regulation.2 9 Secretary Hoover was concerned that advertising
might so dominate the medium that tremendous public service opportunities
would be lost.30 At the same time, however, he realized the dangers inherent
in permitting government control of broadcast content. 31 A subsequent
Supreme Court decision commented on the continuing confusion and chaos
that existed in the 1920's by observing that "[w]ith everybody on the air,
nobody could be heard.",
32
Congress finally recognized the need for action in this area 33 and
passed the Radio Act of 1927. 34 This Act created the five-member Federal
Radio Commission (FRC) and authorized it to control the allocation and use
of radio frequencies.35 The basic provisions of the Radio Act were later
incorporated by Congress in the Communications Act of 1934,36 in which
Congress also replaced the FRC with the present seven-member Federal
Communications Commission (FCC).37 The FCC was created for "the
purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by
wire and radio" 38 and was given the authority to enforce the Communica-
tions Act. 39 To that end, the FCC was granted broad regulatory and licens-
ing powers. 4°
29. Id.
30. 1 E. BARNOUW, A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES: A TOWER IN
BABEL 96 (1966) (citing H. HOOVER, MEMOIRS: THE CABINET AND THE PRESIDENCY 140 (1952)).
31. While calling for extensive controls of this new industry, Hoover testified before the
House Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries: "we can not allow any single person
or group to place themselves in a position where they can censor the material which shall be
broadcasted to the public, nor . . . should [the government] ever be placed in the position of
censoring this material." Hearings on H.R. 7357 Before the House Comm. on the Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1924) (statement of Secretary of Commerce
Herbert Hoover).
32. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943).
33. A Broadcaster's Dilemma, supra note 21, at 510.
34. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). See also Radio Frequency Allocation,
supra note 23, at 9-12.
35. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, §§ 3, 4, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
36. 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970 & Supp. V 1975). "By this Act Congress, in order to
protect the national interest involved in the new and far-reaching science of broadcasting,
formulated a unified and comprehensive regulatory system for the industry. The common
factors in the administration of the various statutes by which Congress had supervised the
different modes of communication led to the creation. . . of the Communications Commis-
sion. But the objectives have remained substantially unaltered since 1927." FCC v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940) (footnote omitted). See also Radio Frequency
Allocation, supra note 23, at 12-14.
37. The FCC also took over certain functions previously exercised by the Interstate
Commerce Commission, which up to that time had had jurisdiction over telephonic and
telegraphic communication and the FRC. 47 U.S.C. §§ 601, 603 (1970); G. ROBINSON & E.
GELLHORN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 148 (1974) [hereinafter cited as ROBINSON &
GELLHORN].
38. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
39. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 303 (1970).
40. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 214 (1943).
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The statutes establish a standard of "public convenience, interest, or
necessity" to govern the FCC's exercise of these two powers. 41 From the
inception of federal regulation, comparative considerations as to the services
to be rendered have governed the application of this standard.42 In this
regard, the FCC has been given a comprehensive mandate to "encourage
the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest." 43
Generalities unrelated to the living problems of radio communica-
tion of course cannot justify exercises of power by the Commis-
sion. Equally so, generalities empty of all concrete considerations
of the actual bearing of regulations promulgated by the Commis-
sion to the subject matter entrusted to it, cannot strike down
exercises of power by the Commission. While Congress did not
give the Commission unfettered discretion to regulate all phases of
the radio industry, it did not frustrate the purposes for which the
Communications Act of 1934 was brought into being by attempting
an itemized catalogue of the specific manifestations of the general
problems for the solution of which it was establishing a regulatory
agency. That would have stereotyped the powers of the Commis-
sion to specific details in regulating a field of enterprise of the
dominant characteristic of which was the rapid pace of its unfold-
ing. And so Congress did what experience had taught it in similar
attempts at regulation, even in fields where the subject-matter of
regulation was far less fluid and dynamic than radio. The essence
of that experience was to define broad areas for regulation and to
establish standards for judgment adequately related in their appli-
cation to the problems to be solved.'
Notwithstanding the broad powers granted to the FCC, Congress did not
authorize the FCC to regulate or license broadcasters "upon the basis of
their political, economic or social views, or upon any other capricious
basis." 45
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the
Commission the power of censorship over the radio communica-
tions or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation
or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission
41. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970 & Supp. V. 1975) (regulatory); 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1970) (licens-
ing). This standard "is as concrete as the complicated factors for judgment in such a field of
delegated authority permit .... " FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138
(1940). However, "[t]his criterion is not to be interpreted as setting up a standard so indefinite
as to confer an unlimited power." FRC v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266,
285 (1933).
42. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943) (citing FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting
Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 n.2 (1940)). "The avowed aim of the Communications Act of 1934 was to
secure the maximum benefits of radio to all the people of the United States." Id. (citing 47
U.S.C. § 303(g) (1970)). Thus, an important element of public interest is the ability of the
licensee to render the best service practicable to the community reached by his broadcasts.
FCC v. Sanders Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940).
43. 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1970).
44. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219-20 (1943).
45. Id. at 226.
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which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication. 4
6
When reviewing FCC actions under the Communications Act, a court
is only required to determine whether the action of the FCC "was based
upon findings supported by evidence, and was made pursuant to authority
granted by Congress." 47 The court may not judge whether the "public
interest" will be furthered or retarded by the FCC action because that
responsibility belongs to Congress and to the FCC.48 "So long as there is
warrant in the record for the judgment of the expert body it must stand.
•. * *'The judicial function is exhausted when there is found to be a
rational basis for the conclusions approved by the administrative body.' "'9
A fundamental concept in the field of broadcast regulation that also
influences judicial review is that of scarcity: the number of applicants
desiring to use the airwaves exceeds the number of available frequencies. 50
The licensing scheme must, therefore, allocate frequencies among appli-
cants, which in turn will limit the number of potential speakers. Professor
Alexander Meiklejohn has observed that "[w]hat is essential is not that
everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.' '51
Two theories that branch from the concept of scarcity support the basic
regulatory scheme of the Communications Act in the face of a First Amend-
ment challenge. The first theory is that the radio spectrum is a " 'public
resource' whose use is permitted only if it serves the 'public interest.' -52
The second theory is that because broadcast frequencies are limited, the
users to whom the FCC grants licenses are in effect given a monopoly.
"[S]uch a monopoly confers a public trust, which must comport with the
public interest." 53
46. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970).
47. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943).
48. Id.
49. Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1939).
50. Note, The First Amendment and the "Abridgeable" Right of Self-Expression, 72
COLUM. L. REV. 1249, 1251 (1972).
There is, however, a minority view as to whether or not a situation of scarcity really exists.
One commentator has noted: "[I]t seems illogical to use outlet scarcity as a basis for differ-
entiating among media while imposing a licensing scheme or fairness doctrine on the more
plentiful medium ... .[W]hatever spectral scarcity does exist technically could be eliminated
by conversion to cable television systems." Broadcast Self-Regulation, supra note 12, at 1542.
"Because a cable system is not limited by a finite number of frequencies, but can be expanded
virtually without bound by adding more lines to the coaxial cable, the scarcity rationale loses all
vitality." Broadcast Self-Regulation, supra note 12, at 1542 n.67. See also R. SMITH, THE
WIRED NATION 7-8 (1972).
51. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM-THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE
26 (1960).
52. ROBINSON & GELLHORN, supra note 37, at 149; see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 n.5 (1969); Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amend-
ment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 46 (1975).
53. ROBINSON & GELLHORN, supra note 37, at 149; see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 383 (1969); Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 61
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The Supreme Court has construed the Act's provisions broadly under
these two standards.54 In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States," the
Court confronted First Amendment problems in the context of a challenge to
the "chain broadcasting" rules.5 6 In effect, the Court upheld the FCC's
power to regulate practices between the networks and their affiliated sta-
tions.57 Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter explained why the rules
could not be struck down as a violation of the First Amendment:
Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available
to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other
modes of expression, it is subject to governmental regulation
... .The right of free speech does not include, however, the right
to use the facilities of radio without a license. The licensing system
established by Congress in the Communications Act of 1934 was a
proper exercise of its power over commerce. The standard it pro-
vided for the licensing of stations was the "public interest, con-
venience, or necessity." Denial of a station license on that ground,
if valid under the Act, is not a denial of free speech.58
The concept of scarcity was reaffirmed in Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC,59 the Supreme Court's first major pronouncement concerning
freedom of expression in broadcasting since National Broadcasting. 60 In
1959, Congress had amended the Communications Act, 61 announcing there-
by that the phrase "public interest," which had been in the Act and its
predecessors since 1927, imposed a duty on broadcasters to discuss both
sides of controversial public issues 62 This duty, better known as the fairness
(D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973); FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
EDITORIALIZING BY BROADCAST LICENSEES, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1258 (1949) [hereinafter cited as
EDITORIALIZING]; Note, Federal Regulation of Radio Broadcasting-Are the Prime Time Access
Rule and the Family Viewing Hour in the Public Interest?, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 902,904 (1976);
Note, Federal Regulation of Radio Broadcasting-Standards and Procedures for Regulating
Format Changes in the Public Interest, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 966, 967 (1975).
54. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219-21 (1943).
55. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
56. "Chain broadcasting" refers to the simultaneous broadcasting of an identical program
by two or more connected stations. 47 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1970). The FCC is given authority to
make special rules applicable to stations engaging in chain broadcasting. 47 U.S.C. § 303(i)
(1970).
57. Broadcasting Self-Regulation, supra note 12, at 1539.
58. 319 U.S. at 226-27.
59. 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969).
60. See Note, Reconciling Red Lion and Tornillo: A Consistent Theory of Media Regula-
tion, 28 STAN. L. REV. 563, 565-66 (1976). "[W]hile the NBC case did establish an expansive
view of Commission powers, it still left a great many First Amendment questions unanswered."
FCC, Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, 39 Fed. Reg. 26,372-73 (1974).
61. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, §1, 73 Stat. 557 (1959) (amending 47 U.S.C.
§ 315(a) (1958) (currently codified at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975))).
62. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969).
This was not an entirely new concept. The FCC (then the FRC) had early expressed the
view that the "public interest requires ample play for the free and fair competition of opposing
views, and the commission believes that the principle applies. . . to all discussions of issues of
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doctrine, 63 was upheld by the Court in Red Lion as a constitutional exercise
of the FCC's authority to promulgate regulations.
[T]he public interest language of the [Communications] Act au-
thorized the [FCC] to require licensees to use their stations for
discussion of public issues, and. . . to implement this requirement
by reasonable rules and regulations which fall short of abridgement
of the freedom of speech and press, and of the censorhip pro-
scribed by § 326 of the Act.'
The Red Lion Court reiterated the scarcity concept as the basis for distin-
guishing First Amendment freedom in broadcasting from traditional First
Amendment freedom in speech and publishing: "[W]here there are substan-
tially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to
allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to
broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write or
publish." 65 The rationale of the fairness doctrine is that fairness in broadcas-
ter programming should contribute to informed public opinion.
It is axiomatic that one of the most vital questions of mass com-
munication in a democracy is the development of an informed
public opinion through the public dissemination of news and ideas
concerning the vital public issues of the day. . . .It is this right of
the public to be informed, rather than any right on the part of the
Government, any broadcast licensee or any individual member of
the public to broadcast his own particular views on any matter,
which is the foundation stone of the American system of broad-
casting. 66
The right of the public to be informed assumes an important role in
accommodating the many interests involved in broadcasting.67 The principle
is now established that where competing First Amendment interests are at
importance to the public." Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. FRC, 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32, 33
(1929), rev'd in part on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
63. The FCC first articulated the fairness doctrine in its 1949 ruling. EDITORIALIZING,
supra note 53, at 1257-58. "The Fairness Doctrine requires that television and radio stations
devote adequate time to controversial issues of public importance, and that they do so fairly by
affording reasonable opportunity for the opposing viewpoint." FRIENDLY, supra note 26, at 13.
The fairness doctrine also requires that a radio or television station provide reply time to answer
personal attacks or political editorials regardless of the willingness or ability of the aggrieved
party to pay for that time. For a comprehensive discussion of the fairness doctrine, its history
and applicable standards, see FCC, Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, 39 Fed.
Reg. 26,372 (1974).
64. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 382 (1969).
65. Id. at 388.
66. EDITORIALIZING, supra note 53, at 1249; accord, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
67. "[I]n broadcasting there must be an accommodation of the interests of listeners and
viewers, the licensed broadcasters, and a host of parties desiring access to broadcasting
facilities, such as networks, indepedent program producers, syndicators, citizens' groups, and
individuals." Barrow, The Fairness Doctrine: A Double Standard for Electronic and Print
Media, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 659, 668 (1975).
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stake, the interests of the listeners are paramount under the First Amend-
ment. 68 In sum, the Communications Act is a regulatory scheme premised
on the concept that broadcast frequencies are a limited public resource that
must be utilized in a manner compatible with the public interest. 69 Satisfying
the public interest standard requires that the interests of viewers be placed in
a paramount position when accommodating the various interests involved in
broadcasting. The FVH policy affects many interests that must be accom-
modated when resolving the First Amendment issues raised by the plaintiffs
in Writers Guild.
H. The Family Viewing Hour Litigation
The FVH litigation began as two separate lawsuits. The first com-
plaint, 70 in Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC,71 was filed by the
Writers Guild,72 the Directors Guild,73 and the Screen Actors Guild,74 as
well as various independent creators, writers, and producers. 75 It alleged
that the adoption of the FVH policy as an amendment to the Television Code
of the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) violated plaintiffs' First
Amendment rights.76 The second complaint, in Tandem Productions, Inc. v.
68. "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount. . . .It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here." Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
69. "The facilities of radio [and by analogy television] are limited and therefore precious;
they cannot be left to wasteful use without detriment to the public interest." NBC v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).
70. Writers Guild Complaint, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
71. 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
72. The Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. and the Writers Guild of America, East,
Inc, "are the recognized and exclusive employee collective bargaining representatives for
writers employed in the television industry. The Writers Guild has approximately 5,000 mem-
bers, many of whom write [television] scripts." Writers Guild Complaint at 2.
73. The Directors Guild of America, Inc. "is the recognized and exclusive employee
collective bargaining representative for directors, first and second assistant directors, unit
production managers, technical coordinators, and other persons who assist directors employed
in the television industry. The Directors Guild has approximately 4,400 members, many of
whom direct and work on programs and shows for television." Id. at 2.
74. The Screen Actors Guild, Inc. is "the recognized and exclusive employee collective
bargaining representative for actors employed in the film industry. The [Screen] Actors Guild
has approximately 30,000 members, many of whom appear on television programs." Id. at 2-3.
75. In addition to the persons listed in note 15 supra, plaintiffs also included Four D
Productions, a California corporation that produces and owns rights to the "Barney Miller"
show, and Concept Plus H Productions, a partnership that produced and owns the rights to
"The Montefuscos." Id. at 4. It should also be noted that "[m]any of the plaintiffs are viewers
of television, or represent viewers of television, as well as members of the creative segment of
the television industry." Id.
76. Id. at 27-28. For a discussion of the National Association of Broadcasters and its
Television Code, see notes 10-12 and accompanying text supra.
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CBS,77 named the same defendants7" and raised similar issues, but focused
on the effect of the implementation of the FVH policy on the television
program "All In The Family." The two lawsuits were consolidated and
tried jointly.
A. Plaintiffs' Allegations
The plaintiffs alleged, in general, that in response to congressional
concern over sex and violence in television programming, the FCC pres-
sured the networks to adopt the FVH policy and that the networks coerced
the NAB into adding the FVH amendment to its Television Code.79 Plain-
tiffs argued that these activities were impermissible and that they violated
the First Amendment right of broadcast licensees to program independently.
Plaintiffs alleged that the FVH policy constituted a prior restraint under a
system that lacked the constitutionally required minimum procedural safe-
guards.80 They also alleged that this resulted in protected material being
deleted from programs to be broadcast during the FVH period.8" There were
77. 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (consolidated with Writers Guild of America,
West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976)). Tandem Productions, Inc. is a
California corporation that produces television programs and licenses the right to broadcast
these programs. One of the programs, "All In The Family," is a half-hour series concerning
the life of a fictional American family, the Bunkers. Tandem complaint at 1, 3.
78. The named defendants were: the Federal Communications Commission (FCC); FCC
Chairman Richard E. Wiley; FCC Commissioners Benjamin C. Hooks, Robert E. Lee, James
H. Quello, Charlotte T. Reid, Glen 0. Robinson, and Abbott Washburn; the television net-
works, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS), National Broadcasting Co., Inc. (NBC),
American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (ABC); and the National Association of Broadcasters
(NAB). Writers Guild Complaint at 1; Tandem Complaint at 1.
79. Writers Guild Complaint at 12-20; Tandem Complaint at 5-6. See generally BROAD-
CASTING, Nov. 3, 1975, at 25; Variety, Nov. 5, 1975, at 10.
Although plaintiffs' primary allegation was a violation of the First Amendment, the Writers
Guild plaintiffs also alleged violations of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et
seq. (1970 & Supp. V 1975); the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 etseq. (1970 &
Supp. V 1975); and the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Writers Guild
Complaint at 1. Tandem Productions also alleged violations of the Communications Act and the
Sherman Act. Tandem Complaint at 1. Each of the government defendants was held to have
violated the Administrative Procedure Act but the remaining allegations did not form a signifi-
cant aspect of the court's order in the case. The plaintiffs' action under section 326 of the
Communications Act of 1934 did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 423 F.
Supp. at 1084. The alleged Sherman Act violations were not addressed in the court's order,
because the anti-trust issues were bifurcated in an earlier pre-trial order.
80. Writers Guild Complaint at 31; Tandem Complaint at 9.
81. Writers Guild Complaint at 23. Writers Guild plaintiffs considered the FVH to be a
threat to television's move toward realistic and socially important themes. Writers Guild
Complaint at 25. Tandem plaintiffs alleged that because of the FVH policy CBS had moved
"All In The Family" from its 8:00 p.m. Saturday time slot to a time outside the FVH. Tandem
Complaint at 6. See also Writers Guild Complaint at 24. Tandem plaintiffs also asserted that the
FVH deprives the public of diversity in entertainment programming, and with respect to "All In
The Family," excluded from the FVH period a program that often deals with issues of
serious concern and significance to the American people. Tandem Complaint at 8.
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further contentions that the FVH policy was impermissibly overbroad 82 and
vague. 83 Plaintiffs also alleged that the FVH policy was not the least
restrictive means of achieving the objectives of the FVH,84 and that there
was no compelling governmental necessity or justification for the FVH
policy. 85
B. The Court's Findings
In the introduction to his exhaustive district court opinion,86 Judge
Warren J. Ferguson stated that "[t]he desirability or undesirability of the
family viewing policy is not the issue. Rather the question is who should
have the right to decide what shall and shall not be broadcast and how and
on what basis should these decisions be made." 87 After resolving the
jurisdictional issues in the case, 88 the court made extensive factual find-
ings.8 9 The court found, inter alia, that Chairman Wiley, acting in his
official capacity and on behalf of the FCC, had responded to "congressional
committee pressure . .. [by launching] a compaign primarily designed to
alter the content of entertainment programming in the early evening
hours. "90
In response to this congressional pressure, 91 Wiley instructed his staff
to examine possible action the FCC could take to protect children from
82. Writers Guild Complaint at 30; Tandem Complaint at 8.
83. Writers Guild Complaint at 31; Tandem Complaint at 8.
84. Writers Guild Complaint at 30; Tandem Complaint at 9.
85. Writers Guild Complaint at 30; Tandem Complaint at 8.
86. 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
87. Id. at 1072.
88. Id. at 1074-92.
89. Id. at 1092-1128.
90. Id. at 1094. See generally note 239 infra, indicating that Wiley had grave reservations
about the constitutionality and propriety of government interference in this area.
91. The court's characterization of congressional committee action as "pressure" may be
misleading. In 1974 the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives directed
the FCC to submit a report to it outlining FCC actions or plans which were designed to protect
children from excessive programming of violence and obscenity. H.R. REP. No. 1139, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974). This report accompanied a House Appropriations bill for the FCC
and other federal agencies. 423 F. Supp. at 1095. A similar directive was issued by the Senate
Appropriations Committee. S. REP. No. 1056, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974); 423 F. Supp. at
1095-96.
The actual language of the House Appropriations Committee report stated that: "The
Committee hopes that the Commission will move promptly to resolve the administrative,
jurisdictional, and constitutional problems associated with this issue." H.R. REP. No. 1139,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974) (emphasis added), quoted in 423 F. Supp. at 1095. Similarly, the
Senate Appropriations Committee report stated: "The Committee also joins with the House in
urging the Commission to proceed as vigorously and as rapidly as possible-within Constitu-
tional limitations-to determine what is its power in the area of program violence and obsceni-
ty, particularly as to their effect on children." S. REP. No. 1056, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974)
(emphasis added), quoted in 423 F. Supp. at 1095-96.
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excessive programming of violence and obscenity. 92 FCC staff proposals
93
were subsequently presented to Wiley, who then took a series of steps
designed to bring Commission pressure to bear on the industry.94 These
steps included public speeches calling for industry self-regulation, 95 meet-
ings with network executives, 96 a proposal for a joint statement by the
networks on the subject of sex and violence, 97 and a suggestion that the
NAB code express a new position on this topic. 98 The court concluded that
FCC pressure was a substantial factor in NAB adoption of the FVH policy.
99
The court found that in December 1974 and January 1975 each of the
three networks announced similar proposals concerning the broadcasting of
programs suitable for general family viewing.100 The court also found that
Wiley had made it clear that he was aiming at industry-wide acceptance for
the FVH scheduling proposal.' ° 1 In April 1975, following more public
speeches' 02 and additional meetings, 103 the Television Board of the NAB
adopted the FVH policy as an amendment to its Television Code. 104 By
adopting the FVH policy, the Television Board could prevent deviations
from the FVH rule and eliminate any competitive advantage that a network
might gain by refusing to comply with the policy.'0 5 The court's finding on
the effect of the Code amendment was that "instead of programming on the
92. 423 F. Supp. at 1095-96. But see notes 150-60 and accompanying text infra.
93. "[T]he FCC staff presented three proposals to Chairman Wiley which they hoped
might serve as appropriate Commission responses to the Congressional directives . . . .The
goal of pressuring broadcasters into regulatory efforts was manifest throughout the proposals."
423 F. Supp. at 1096.
94. Id. at 1097-98.
95. Id. at 1098, 1117-18, 1121.
96. Id. at 1098-99, 1122.
97. Id. at 1099.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1112.
100. Id. at 1110. At this time, however, CBS was committed to a FVH policy only if the
NAB adopted a Code amendment. Id.
101. Id. at I100.
102. Id. at 1114-16, 1118.
103. Id. at 1117-18.
104. Id. at 1119. The court found that from the outset of the official deliberations of the
NAB, there was evidence of FCC involvement in and encouragement of NAB enforcement of
the FVH policy. Id. at 111 I.
105. Id. at 1094, 1100, 1108 n.63, 1110-11, 1125.
CBS president Arthur Taylor feared that if CBS publicly committed itself to such a policy
that the commitment would work to CBS' competitive disadvantage in the absence of a binding
enforcement mechanism applicable to the industry at large. Past experience in children's
programming had led him to the conviction that broadcasters, more interested in dollars than in
the public interest, would use violence as a tool to hike program ratings if they were left free to
program in their own discretion. CBS thus prepared to delegate its program discretion to the
NAB, but only if its major competitors could be persuaded to do so as well. FCC pressure was
necessary to achieve this objective. Id. at 1094.
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basis of their own independent judgment, broadcasters have been forced to
program with a view toward what would be considered unobjectionable by
the Television Code Review Board,"106 The court found evidence of signifi-
cant self-censorship. 107 In addition to the censorship that resulted from the
FVH, the court found that there was significant economic injury.'0o Plain-
tiffs incurred increased production costs due to the frenzied character of the
editing process that occurred as producers attempted to conform to the
network censors' interpretation of the FVH policy.' 9 The court also found
that the syndication value 110 of "All In The Family" had been significantly
diminished by the defendants' conduct."'
C. Legal Liability
In discussing the defendants' legal liability, the court separated them
into two groups: the private defendants 112 and the government defend-
ants. 113 With respect to the private defendants, the court held that broadcast-
ers were free to adopt the FVH policy provided their decision to do so was
based on their independent judgment that the particular programming policy
was best suited to promotion of the public interest. 114 In this case, however,
it was clear that the FVH policy was caused substantially by government
pressure and that this was not the kind of independent broadcasting decision
required by the First Amendment." 5 Because of this governmental intrusion
through the FCC and its Chairman, the adoption of the FVH amendment to
the NAB Code and the networks' participation in its adoption and subse-
106. Id. at 1125.
107. Id. at 1126. See text accompanying notes 399-400 infra.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Syndication is the licensing of television programs to local television stations, both
network affiliates and non-network stations. Syndication for rebroadcast is frequently the most
important source of revenue for a successful entertainment series originally broadcast by one of
the networks. Tandem Complaint at 9.
The primary market for syndication to independent stations not owned or operated by the
networks is the first hour of prime time, referred to as the local access hour. Because programs
unacceptable for viewing during the FVH cannot be syndicated for this crucial portion of the
syndication market, their "syndication value" is substantially reduced. Writers Guild Com-
plaint at 26-27.
111. 423 F. Supp. at 1127.
112. The private defendants were the three major television networks (ABC, CBS, and
NBC) and the NAB. Id. at 1072.
113. The government defendants were the FCC and the individual FCC Commissioners,
including Chairman Wiley. Id. See note 78 supra.
114. 423 F. Supp. at 1130. This holding would apply even if "the source of the idea is
governmental, and even if government officials have encouraged the policy." Id. See notes
236-237 and accompanying text infra.
115. 423 F. Supp. at 1140.
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quent enforcement constituted state action that violated the First Amend-
ment. 1
16
The court stated that its previous discussion of First Amendment
principles regarding the private defendants was applicable to the govern-
ment defendants, but that less stringent standards should be applied to
trigger First Amendment liability of the government defendants. 1 7 The
court found that the FCC resorted to informal coercion" 8 and stated,
"[t]his lawless conduct cannot be tolerated if broadcasters are to enjoy
meaningful First Amendment freedoms." 19 The court emphasized that the
combination of uncertainty in the FCC relicensing procedure and vagueness
in relicensing standards had enabled the Commission to apply pressure
effectively. 120
The court reiterated that Congress had denied the FCC any power to
censor broadcasts, including any examination of thought or expression to
prevent publication of "objectionable" material. 21 The court rejected "any
suggestion that the Commission has the power. . . to screen out 'offen-
sive' material with no more discriminating a lens than the public interest
. . .. "122 "The existence of the threats, and the attempted securing of
commitments coupled with the promise to publicize non-compliance in this
case constituted per se violations of the First Amendment." 23 The court
thus found that FCC action had compromised licensee independence in two
ways, both of which violated the First Amendment: the FCC pressured the
networks to adopt the FVH policy and the FCC participated in a conspiracy
with the networks to usurp licensee independence through the vehicle of the
NAB.1 24
116. Id. at 1140-43. The court explained: "The networks are fully aware that they have a
First Amendment and statutory duty to program exclusively on the basis of their independent
judgment. They have a duty as public trustees and fiduciaries to resist government intrusions
into the programming domain." Id. at 1143.
117. Id. at 1146. This is because with respect to the government defendants, "considera-
tions of private autonomy cut in the opposite direction. The more that government is permitted
to interfere in programming by way of pressure, threats, and intimidation, the less independent
broadcasters will be or appear to be. If broadcasters face liability for responding to government
pressure (or risk it by appearing to do so), it is critical that appropriate government pressure be
terminated." Id.
118. Id. at 1149.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1146.
121. Id. at 1148 (quoting Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 171
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969) (quoting Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v.
FCC, 360 U.S. 525, 527 (1959))).
122. Id. at 1150.
123. Id. at 1151.
124. Id.
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D. Remedies
The court disclaimed any authority to declare an end to the FVH1 5 and
held that the networks were free to continue or discontinue the FVH policy
as long as that decision was based upon their independent conception of the
public interest.12 6 The court did, however, issue several declarations.127 It
ruled that existing network adoption of the FVH violated the First Amend-
ment because the policy was an impermissible product of governmental
action.12 8 It also declared that NAB adoption of the FVH amendment
involved First Amendment violations by each of the networks, that NAB
enforcement of the FVH policy violated the First Amendment, and that the
networks were required to program on the basis of their own judgment rather
than that of the NAB.129 In this regard, the court held that "[t]he NAB [had]
the right to adopt as part of its code anything that it [wished] but it [had] no
First Amendment right to interfere with the rights of the public to independ-
ent broadcaster decisionmaking." 1 30 The court concluded that the net-
works were liable for any financial damages that Tandem suffered as a result
of the adoption of the FVH policy. 131
As to the government defendants, the court declared that the FCC could
not enforce the FVH policy.132 The court refused, however, "to enjoin the
Commission from enforcing the FVH policy or the commitments associated
with it.", 133 Although Tandem had asked for damages against the govern-
ment defendants, the court held that Tandem could not escape the doctrine
of sovereign immunity and that no exceptions to the doctrine were avail-
able.134
HIL. First Amendment Considerations
The problems inherent in any analysis of the application of the First
Amendment to broadcasting were well stated by Judge J. Skelly Wright:
125. Id. at 1072. For the same reason, the court denied Tandem Production's request that
CBS be directed to move "All In The Family" back into the FVH period. Id. at 1154.
126. Id. at 1153.
127. Id. at 1154-55.
128. Id. at 1153.
129. Id. at 1154-55.
130. Id. at 1154.
131. Id. at 1162. The Writers Guild plaintiffs had not asked for damages. Id. at 1157.
132. Id. at 1155.
133. Id. at 1157.
134. Id. at 1158-59. Although the Eleventh Amendment immunized only the states from
certain suits in federal court, the Supreme Court early announced the doctrine of sovereign
immunity with respect to the federal government: "the government is not liable to be sued,
except with its own consent, given by law." United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286,
288 (1846).
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[In] some areas of the law it is easy to tell the good guys from the
bad guys. . . . In the current debate over broadcast media and the
First Amendment . . each debator claims to be the real protec-
tor of the First Amendment, and the analytical problems are much
more difficult than in ordinary constitutional adjudication . . .
the answers are not easy. 135
In a line of cases beginning with United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc. 136 in 1948 and continuing through Jenkins v. Georgia 3 7 in 1974, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly applied First Amendment protection not only
to speech, but to artistic and entertainment programming as well. In
Paramount, the Court stated, "[W]e have no doubt that moving pictures,
like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is
guaranteed by the First Amendment.' ' 1 8 At the same time, the Court has
recognized that motion pictures and, by analogy, television "are [not]
necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other particular
method of expression. Each method [of communication] tends to present its
own peculiar problems." 13 9 "But the basic principles of freedom of speech
and the press, like the First Amendment's command, do not vary." 140
The following sections of this note will review general First Amend-
ment principles in the areas of state action, prior restraints, vagueness, and
overbreadth, and will apply these doctrines to the facts of the FVH case. The
first section reviews the areas of speech, such as obscenity, that are not
granted First Amendment protection and explains the rationale for their
unprotected status. The next section discusses the doctrine of state action, a
focal point of the decision in the FVH case. The third section discusses prior
restraints and the heavy burden of justification that must be met to warrant
135. FRIENDLY, supra note 26, at ix. Judge Wright made this statement in a speech given in
June 1973 before the National Law Center at George Washington University.
136. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
137. 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
138. 334 U.S. at 166. See also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952);
American Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 374, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd on
other grounds, 347 U.S. 284 (1954); Weaver v. Jordon, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 242, 411 P.2d 289, 294, 49
Cal. Rptr. 537, 542 (1966).
139. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
The general issues raised when relatively small scale communication is supplanted by mass
media technology as a prime source of national information have been discussed in Z. CHAFEE,
GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS (1947). See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION (1970); M. ERNST, THE FIRST FREEDOM 125-80 (1946); T. ROBINSON,
RADIO NETWORKS AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 75-87 (1943); Kalven, Broadcasting Public
Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J.L. & ECON. 15 (1967).
140. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952). Justice Douglas reiterated
this line of thought in his concurring opinion in Superior Films, Inc. v. Dep't. of Educ., 346
U.S. 587 (1954): "[m]otion pictures are of course a different medium of expression than the
public speech, the radio, the stage, the novel, or the magazine. But the First Amendment draws
no distinction between the various methods of communicating ideas." Id. at 589 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
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regulation of speech. The fourth section discusses the doctrines of vague-
ness and overbreadth, including the principle of "least restrictive means"
and suggests some less drastic alternatives to the FVH policy.
A. Obscenity and Other Areas of Unprotected Speech
The First Amendment protection given to speech is rooted in a desire to
ensure the unfettered exchange of ideas regarding political and social
change. While speech is generally accorded First Amendment protection,
there are certain specific areas of speech that, in any context, are outside
the protection of the First Amendment. Areas of speech defined as incite-
ment, 141 obscenity, 142 libel,143 solicitation of crime,'" fraudulent asser-
tion, 145 and fighting words 146 have all been denied First Amendment protec-
tion.
It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly out-weighed by the social interest in order and morality. 47
The basic concept that certain areas of speech are unprotected was reflected
in the Communications Act of 1934148 and has been recognized by the FCC.
[The FCC] readily concedes that it is precluded from examining a
program for taste or content, unless the recognized exceptions to
censorship apply: for example, obscenity, profanity, indecency,
programs inciting to riots, programs designed or inducing toward
the commission of crime, lotteries, etc. These exceptions, in part,
are written into the United States Code and, in part, are recognized
in judicial decisions. 149
Obscenity is one area of speech that is not constitutionally protect-
ed. 150 Although declining to give First Amendment protection to obscenity,
141. E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
142. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463
(1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
143. E.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974).
144. E.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Fox v. Washing-
ton, 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
145. E.g., Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178 (1948).
146. E.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
147. Id. at 572.
148. "No person within the jurisdiction of the United States shall utter any obscene,
indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication." Communications Act of
1934, ch. 652, tit. III, § 326, 48 Stat. 1091 (repealed 1948) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1464
(1970)).
149. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, EN BANC PROGRAMMING INQUIRY, 44 F.C.C.
2303, 2310 (1960).
150. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the Court stated, "the unconditional
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the Court in Roth v. United States151 emphasized the importance of applying
the proper standard when judging whether material is obscene. "The funda-
mental freedoms of speech and press have contributed greatly to the devel-
opment and well-being of our free society and are indispensable to its
continued growth ... 152 With regard to these fundamental freedoms of
speech and press, the Court cautioned that "[cleaseless vigilance is the
watchword to prevent their erosion by Congress or by the States."'153 In
1973 the Court further refined its obscenity standard in Miller v. Califor-
nia,' 54 while reaffirming the Roth holding that obscene material is not
protected by the First Amendment. 155 The Court reasoned that "[t]he First
Amendment protects works which, taken as a whole, have serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value, regardless of whether the government
or a majority of the people approve of the ideas these works represent
.... "156 But the Court distinguished "public portrayal of hard core
sexual conduct' ' 7 as not being within the First Amendment assurance of
the" 'unfettered interchange of ideas.' "l15 At no time has anyone contend-
ed that the subject matter to which the FVH policy addresses itself is within
an area of unprotected speech. "Here, however, the government defendants
have made no attempt to suggest that the government policy is supported by
evidence sufficient to permit the court to conclude that exceptions to First
Amendment principles justify government regulation.' ' 159 While some
might contend that protrayals of violence are "obscene" in the colloquial
sense of that word, the material proscribed by the FVH policy does not meet
any of the standards for obscenity as set forth in Miller,160 and, therefore,
phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance," id. at 483, and
held "that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech." Id. at 485.
151. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The standard set forth in Roth is "whether to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to prurient interest." Id. at 489 (footnote omitted).
152. Id. at 488.
153. Id.
154. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
155. Id. at 36. The standard set forth in Miller is "(a) whether 'the average person, applying
contemporary community standards' would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest . . . ; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. at 24 (citation
omitted).
The Miller Court specifically rejected the "'utterly without redeeming social value' "test
which it had previously set forth in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). 413
U.S. at 23.
156. Id. at 34.
157. Id. at 35.
158. Id. at 34 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
159. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1149 (C.D. Cal.
1976).
160. 413 U.S. at 24; see note 155 supra.
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does not lose its First Amendment protection on that ground. The speech
proscribed by the FVH is also not libelous, nor does it fall within the
category of fighting words.'61 Therefore, the regulation of speech under the
FVH policy, if justifiable at all, would have to be upheld as a permissible
regulation of protected speech under a First Amendment standard that is
unique to expression in the broadcast media.
B. The State Action Requirement
The decision in Writers Guild was not concerned with the validity of
the FVH itself, but rather with the constitutionality of the manner in which
the policy was adopted. 162 A major portion of the FVH decision was, in fact,
devoted to the issue of state action. This subsection analyzes the state action
doctrine as well as the holding of the court on this issue.
The speech guarantee of the First Amendment applies to actions taken
by Congress 163 and, through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,' 64 to actions taken by states as well. The actions of individu-
als, private organizations, and associations, unless tainted by government
action, are not limited by First Amendment guarantees. 165 The threshold
issue to any finding of a First Amendment violation is thus whether or not
there has been state action. The doctrine of state action has developed into
two different theories: state function and state involvement. 166
161. Nor is the speech procribed by the FVH claimed to be incitement, solicitation of
crime, or fraudulent assertion. See generally notes 141, 144-45 supra.
162. 423 F. Supp. at 1072. "Much of the energy associated with this case has been
generated because the plaintiffs and defendants disagree about the wisdom of the family
viewing policy. In the last analysis, however, this is not the family hour case. . . . This court
will not evaluate the family viewing policy except to say that individual broadcast licensees
have the right and the duty to exercise independent judgment in deciding whether or not to
follow that policy." Id.
163. See note 19 supra.
164. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
165. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972).
166. The distinction between state function and state involvement was first made by Justice
Harlan in his dissenting opinion to the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Justice Harlan
utilized public conveyances on land and water as examples of state function. "[Railroads] are
none the less public highways becaused [sic] controlled and owned by private corporations; that
it is a part of the function of government to make and maintain highways for the convenience of
the public, that no matter who is the agent, or what is the agency, the function performed is
that of the State." Id. at 38 (Harlan, J', dissenting). These examples of state functions were
contrasted with an example of state involvement through the grant of a license to operate a
purely private business. "It may be argued that the managers of such places [of public
amusement] have no duties to perform with which the public are, in any legal sense, concerned,
or with which the public have any right to interfere. . . . My answer is, that places of public
amusement. . . are established and maintained under direct license of the law. The authority
to establish and maintain them comes from the public." Id. at 41 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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The state function theory is illustrated by the early voting rights cases
such as Smith v. Allright, 67 in which the Court held that "state delegation
to a party of the power to fix the qualifications of primary elections is
delegation of a state function that may make the party's action the action of
the state." 1 68 The theory of state function is also illustrated by those cases in
which private facilities have been found to have the attributes of a town or
public facility.' 69 Most recently the Court has applied the state function
theory when a private entity exercises powers that have traditionally been
"exclusively reserved to the State," "associated with sovereignty," or are
"the exclusive prerogative of the State." 170 In Writers Guild the court did
not reach plaintiffs' contentions under the state function theory. 17 1 In fact,
167. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
168. Id. at 660. In Smith, the Court held that the Fifteenth Amendment forbade the
exclusion of blacks from primary elections conducted by the Democratic Party in Texas.
Relying on the language of United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), the Court stated that
the primary had a recognized place in the electoral scheme and made it clear that delegating
power to fix the qualifications in primary elections was delegation of a state function that might
constitute state action. 321 U.S. at 660. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), involving
the exclusion of blacks from "pre-primary" elections of the Jaybird Democratic Association,
an organization of all the white voters in a Texas county. Candidates who won the pre-primary
elections usually ran unopposed in the Democratic party primary and won both the primary and
general election which followed. Id. at 463-65. The Court held that this election was subject to
the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 470. In a concurring opinion Justice Clark stated that "when a
state structures its electoral apparatus in a form which devolves upon a political organization
the uncontested choice of public officials, that organization itself, in whatever disguise, takes
on those attributes of government which draw the Constitution's safeguards into play." Id. at
484 (Clark, J., concurring).
169. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S.
551 (1972); Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). In Marsh the Court held that a state cannot,
consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, impose criminal punishment on
persons distributing religious literature on the premises of a company-owned town contrary to
the wishes of the town's management. The Court reasoned that a state or municipality could not
completely bar the distribution of literature containing religious or political ideas on its streets,
sidewalks, and public places. The mere fact that all the property interests in town were held by
a single company was not sufficient to give that company the power, enforceable by a state
statute, to abridge First Amendment freedoms. 326 U.S. at 504-05. "Whether a corporation or
municipality owns or possesses the town the public in either case has an identical interest in that
functioning of the community in such a manner that the channels of communication remain
free." Id. at 507. The Court found that the company-owned town in Marsh did not "function
any differently from any other town," id. at 508, and indirectly analogized it to owners of
privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes, and railroads. Id. at 506. Such "facilities are built and
operated primarily to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially a public function
it is subject to state regulation." Id.
170. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974).
171. "Nor is it necessary to reach plaintiff's contention that network-NAB domination of
the airwaves constitutes the usurpation of and implicit delegation by government of a function
exclusively reserved to itself (i.e., regulation of broadcasting) and thus is state action for First
Amendment purposes." 423 F. Supp. at 1144 (citations omitted).
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the Supreme Court has not clearly indicated whether the broadcast media,
because of governmental licensing, regulation, and allocation of the broad-
casting spectrum, can be characterized as performing a state function. 172
The other theory of state action is that of state involvement. When there
is evidence of "that degree of state participation and involvement" 173 that
the Constitution was designed to prohibit, state action can then be imputed
to what would otherwise appear to be private conduct. Regulations and
restraints can also result from a combination of private and governmental
actions. 174 A comparison of some of these cases is necessary for a clear
understanding of the circumstances under which the Court has found state
action through state involvement.
NAACP v. Alabama 175 illustrates a state action finding that was based
upon a combination of private and governmental action. In that case, the
NAACP, in connection with state court litigation, had been ordered to
produce a large quantity of its records and papers, including its membership
lists. The NAACP contended that such compelled disclosure of its member-
ship lists would abridge the freedom of association of its members. 176 The
Court stated that although Alabama had taken no direct action to restrict the
freedom of association of NAACP members, the abridgement of such rights
"may inevitably follow from varied forms of governmental action." 177 The
Court rejected the state's contention that the allegedly repressive effect of
such compulsory disclosure was a result of private community pressure
172. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). In that case, Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist clearly thought that a broadcast licensee was neither a "partner"
of government nor was it engaged in any "symbiotic relationship" with government. Id. at 114-
21 (opinion of Burger, C.J.). Justices Douglas and Stewart at least formally agreed there was no
"state action" but their views seemed impelled by the conclusion to which they would have
been forced by reaching the opposite view. Id. at 132 (Stewart, J., concurring); 412 U.S. at 148
(Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justices Brennan and Marshall found the requisite
governmental action. Id. at 170, 172-81 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). However, at
least as to the state function theory of government action, a guess may be hazarded. Six
justices appear to have implicitly rejected the state function theory as to broadcast media.
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Rehnquist discussed the state action
issue in terms of the governmental involvement theory. Justices Stewart and Douglas found no
government action. The remaining three Justices either expressly refrained from deciding the
issue (Blackmun and Powell) or assumed state action, arguendo, without specifying the applica-
ble theory (White). Confirmation of the inapplicability of the state function theory may be
found in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), wherein the Court rejected a
state function argument with regard to an electric utility that was subject to heavy state
regulation. 419 U.S. at 352-53; see text accompanying notes 199-216 infra.
173. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961). See also Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
174. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66-68 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
175. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
176. Id. at 460.
177. Id. at 461.
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rather than state action. 178 The Court concluded that "[t]he crucial factor is
the interplay of governmental and private action, for it is only after the
initial exertion of state power . . that private action takes hold.'
179
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 180 the Court found that a
private restaurant owner violated the Fourteenth Amendment by refusing to
serve a customer on racial grounds,' 8 ' notwithstanding that amendment's
express application to state action only. The restaurant owner leased space
in a building owned by a state-created parking authority. The Burton Court
found that the relationship of the private restaurant to the public parking
facility in which it was located was mutually beneficial: guests of the
restaurant had a convenient place to park their cars and this convenience
probably increased demand for the authority's parking facilities.'8 2 These
mutual benefits, coupled with the authority's activities and responsibilities,
made the private restaurant an integral part of a public parking facility; this
interrelationship constituted sufficient state involvement and participation in
the discriminatory action for the Court to hold that an essentially private act
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 3 The test articulated in Burton was
that "unless to some significant extent the State in any of its manifestations
has been found to have become involved in [private conduct], ' 184 there is
no state action. "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the
nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true
significance.' 8 5
In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,186 a private club operating with a
liquor license issued by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board refused to
serve food and beverages to a guest because he was black.187 The Court held
that, with one exception, 18  the regulatory scheme enforced by the Pennsyl-
vania Liquor Control Board did not sufficiently implicate the state in the
discriminatory guest policies of Moose Lodge so as to make the latter "state
action" within the ambit of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 8 9 The Court distinguished the type of state involvement in
178. Id. at 462.
179. Id. at 463.
180. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
181. Id. at 726.
182. Id. at 724.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 722.
185. Id.
186. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
187. Id.
188. See notes 194-98 and accompanying text infra.
189. 407 U.S. at 171-72, 177.
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Moose Lodge from that in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority. 190 In
Moose Lodge, the Court found "nothing approaching the symbiotic rela-
tionship between lessor and lessee that was present in Burton." 191 Moose
Lodge, unlike the restaurant in Burton, "quite ostentatiously proclaim[ed]
the fact that it [was] not open to the public at large. . . .[Instead,] Moose
Lodge is a private social club in a private building."' 192 Other than the
general effect caused by the allocation of licenses, 193 "the Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Board plays absolutely no part in establishing or enforcing
the membership or guest policies of the club that it licenses to serve
liquor." 94
The exception to the finding of no state action involved the regulation
of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board adopted pursuant to a statute,
which required that" '[e]very club licensee shall adhere to all the provisions
of its Constitution and By-Laws.' "195 While it was argued that the purpose
of this provision was to prevent what was actually a public club from hiding
its discriminatory policies behind the private club label, the Court found that
the "effect of this particular regulation . . . would be to place state
sanctions behind [Moose Lodge's] discriminatory membership rules
... "196 The Liquor Control Board regulation thereby resulted in the
190. Id. at 174-76 (distinguishing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715
(1961)). Actions by Moose Lodge were not state action under the state function theory because
Moose Lodge did not discharge a function to perform a service that would otherwise be
performed by the state.
191. 407 U.S. at 175.
192. Id.
193. Id. (footnote omitted). "The only effect that the state licensing of Moose Lodge to
serve liquor can be said to have on the right of any other Pennsylvanian to buy or be served
liquor on premises other than those of Moose Lodge is that for some purposes club licenses are
counted in the maximum number of licenses that may be issued in a given municipality.
Basically each municipality has a quota of one retail license for each 1,500 inhabitants. Licenses
issued to hotels, municipal golf courses, and airport restaurants are not counted in this quota,
nor are club licenses until the maximum number of retail licenses is reached. Beyond that point,
neither additional retail licenses nor additional club licenses may be issued as long as the
number of issued and outstanding retail licenses remains at or above the statutory maximum."
Id. at 176.
194. Id. at 175 (footnote omitted).
195. Id. at 177 (quoting Regulations of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board § 113.09
(June 1970 ed.)).
196. 407 U.S. at 178. Between the time of the trial at the district court level and the
disposition of this case by the Supreme Court, the bylaws of Moose Lodge were altered to
apply the same sort of racial restrictions to guests as were applied to members. Id. In the
district court opinion the applicable section of the constitution and general by-laws of the
Supreme Lodge to which the local lodge was bound under its charter, was characterized as
"permitting members to invite non-members, apparently without limitatons, to social clubs
maintained by a lodge." Irvis v. Scott, 318 F. Supp. 1246, 1247 n.4 (M.D. Pa. 1970). By the time
this case reached the Supreme Court, however, the relevant section of the bylaws of the
Supreme Lodge permitted guest privileges to be granted only to persons who were eligible for
membership. "There shall never at any time be admitted to any social club or home maintained
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"sanctions of the State [being invoked] to enforce a discriminatory private
rule. " 97 The Court found state action in violation of the equal protection
clause on this narrow ground. 198
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 199 the Court decided that there
was not sufficient state involvement to make Metropolitan Edison's conduct
attributable to the state for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. 200 In
Jackson, Metropolitan Edison Co., a privately owned and operated Pennsyl-
vania corporation, held a certificate of public convenience issued by the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission empowering it to deliver electricity
to a service area that included York, Pennsylvania. 20 1 As a condition of its
certification, Metropolitan was subject to extensive regulation by the state
utility commission.2°2 Under a provision of the general tariff that Met-
ropolitan was required to file with the commission, it had the right to
discontinue service to any customer upon reasonable notice for nonpayment
of bills.203 Pursuant to this provision, service to the residence of petitioner
Catherine Jackson was terminated. 2 4 Jackson contended that under state
law she was entitled to reasonably continuous electrical service to her home,
and that Metropolitan's termination of her service for alleged nonpayment,
an action allowed by the provision of the general tariff Metropolitan had
filed with the commission, constituted state action depriving her of property
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantee.20 5
Since private action is immune from the restrictions of the Fourteenth
Amendment,20 6 it was necessary for the Court to determine whether Met-
ropolitan's conduct was "private" or "state" action. 20 7 Here the utility
company was privately owned and operated, but many of the details of its
business were subject to state regulation. 20 8 The Court noted that "[t]he
mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself
or operated by the Lodge, any person who is not a member of some lodge in good standing. The
House Committee may grant guest privileges to persons who are eligible for membership in the
fraternity consistent with governmental laws and regulations." 407 U.S. at 178 n.6.
197. Id. at 179.
198. Id.
199. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
200. Id. at 358.
201. Id. at 346.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 347.
205. Id. at 348. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 348-49 (quoting U.S. CON sT. amend. XIV).
206. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (dictum).
207. 419 U.S. at 349-50.
208. Id. at 350.
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convert its action into that of the state for Fourteenth Amendment pur-
poses." 20 9 It also stated that the acts of a heavily regulated utility with
characteristics of a governmentally protected monopoly may more readily
be found to be "state" acts than the acts of an entity lacking these character-
istics. 210 The test is whether "there is a sufficiently close nexus between the
State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of
the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. "211
The Court in Jackson found that such a "sufficiently close nexus" did
not exist.212 In response to the argument that state action resulted from the
monopoly status allegedly conferred upon Metropolitan by the state, the
Court said that even assuming the fact that the state had granted Metropoli-
tan a monopoly, this fact was not determinative in deciding whether Met-
ropolitan's termination of service constituted state action for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes. 21 3 Although petitioner Jackson had also argued that
Metropolitan's termination was state action because the state had specifical-
ly authorized and approved the termination practice by the commission's
approval of a general tariff that included the termination provision, the
Court explained that the nature of governmental regulation of private
utilities is such that the state regulatory scheme may require a utility to
obtain approval for practices that a less regulated business could institute
without any approval from a regulatory body.2 14 Where the commission has
not ordered such a practice, however, approval by the commission of a
practice intiated by the utility does not transmute such a practice into state
action.215 The Court concluded that Metropolitan was a heavily regulated,
privately owned utility with at least a partial monopoly on providing electri-
cal service within its territory and that it had elected to terminate Jackson's
service in a manner in which the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
found permissible under state law. The Court held, however, that this was
not sufficient to connect the state with Metropolitan's actions in terminating
the service and to make this conduct state action for Fourteenth Amendment
purposes. 216
209. Id.
210. Id. at 351.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 351, 358.
213. Id. at 351-52. The Court cited Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462
(1952), where the Court dealt with the activities of the District of Columbia Transit Co., a
congressionally established monopoly, but expressly disclaimed reliance on the monopoly
status of the transit authority. 419 U.S. at 352.
214. 419 U.S. at 357.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 358-59.
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As previously noted, the Supreme Court has not clearly identified the
state action theory that should be applied in the context of broadcasting.
217
In CBS v. Democratic National Committee ,218 the Court considered the
question whether a broadcast licensee's general policy of not selling adver-
tising time to individuals or groups wishing to speak out on issues they
consider important violated the Communications Act of 1934219 or the First
Amendment. This case dealt with two orders announced on the same day in
which the FCC had ruled that a broadcaster who meets his obligation to
provide full and fair coverage of public issues was not required to accept
editorial advertisements.22 In an opinion written by Judge J. Skelly Wright,
a majority of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed the FCC, holding "that a flat ban on paid public issue announce-
ments is in violation of the First Amendment, at least when other sorts of
paid announcements are accepted., 221 The United States Supreme Court
later reversed the Court of Appeals, 222 and held that the policies complained
of did not constitute governmental action violative of the First Amend-
ment.2 23 The Court first reviewed the unique and special problems to which
broadcasting is subject due to the scarcity of the resource, 224 and then stated:
[B]alancing the various First Amendment interests involved in the
broadcast media and determining what best serves the public's
right to be informed is a task of a great delicacy and difficulty. The
process must necessarily be undertaken within the framework of
the regulatory scheme that has evolved over the course of the past
half century.'
Since the First Amendment, as previously discussed,226 is a restraint on
government action and not a restraint on private persons, the Court had to
determine whether the action of a broadcast licensee such as that challenged
in CBS was "governmental" or "state" action for purposes of the First
Amendment.227
It appears from the language used in the various opinions in CBS that
in the area of broadcasting, the test that would be used to determine whether
217. See note 172 and accompanying text supra.
218. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
219. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
220. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 25 F.C.C. 2d 216, 232-33 (1970); Business Executives Move
for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C. 2d 242, 246-47 (1970).
221. Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 646 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
222. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 132 (1973).
223. Id. at 121.
224. Id. at 101-03 (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)). See
generally notes 128-47 and accompanying text supra.
225. 412 U.S. at 102.
226. See notes 163-65 and accompanying text supra.
227. 412 U.S. at 114-15 (citing Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451,461 (1952)).
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or not there was state action with respect to the First Amendment is that of
state involvement rather than state function. 228 Four justices discussed the
state action issue using language from the state involvement theory. 2 9
Although Justice Stewart's concurring opinion agreed that there was no
governmental involvement, it also indicated a reluctance ever to find state
action due to a fear that broadcasters would lose their own First Amendment
rights as a result.230 Justice Douglas concluded that the philosophy of the
First Amendment required that television and radio stand in the same
protected position as do newspapers and magazines but that there was no
governmental action. 23 1 Justice White believed that government action was
present.232 Justices Blackmun and Powell, concluding that the governmental
action issue did not affect the case, expressly refrained from deciding it.13
In his separate opinion, Chief Justice Burger explained one important reason
for his conclusion that there was not state action:
[W]ere we to read the First Amendment to spell out governmental
action in the circumstances presented here, few licensee decisions
on the content of broadcasts or the processes of editorial evalua-
tion would escape constitutional scrutiny. In this sensitive area so
sweeping a concept of governmental action would go far in practi-
cal effect to undermine nearly a half century of unmistakable
congressional purpose to maintain-no matter how difficult the
task-essentially private broadcast journalism held only broadly
accountable to public interest standards. To do this Congress, and
the Commission as its agent, must remain in a posture of flexibility
to chart a workable "middle course" in its quest to preserve a
228. See note 172 supra.
229. After sifting the facts and weighing the circumstances, Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist concluded that "the Commission [had] not fostered the licensee policy," that
the Government was not "a 'partner' to the action of the broadcast licensee," and that the
Government had not "engaged in a 'symbiotic relationship' with the licensee, profiting from the
invidious discrimination of its proxy." Id. at 118-19 (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)). They then
concluded that the licensee policies complained of did not constitute government action viola-
tive of the First Amendment. Id. at 119.
Dissenting Justices Brennan and Marshall identified several indicia of governmental in-
volvement: first, "public 'ownership' of an essential element in the operations of a private
enterprise"; second, "direct dependence of broadcasters upon the Federal Government for
their 'right' to operate broadcast frequencies"; third, "extensive governmental control over the
broadcast industry"; fourth, "specific governmental involvement in the broadcaster policy."
Id. at 174-77 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). They then concluded that the government
"'[had] so far insinuated itself into a position' of participation in this policy that [broadcast
licensee action] must be subjected to the restraints of the First Amendment." Id. at 181
(Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
230. Id. at 139 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart's views closely approach those
expressed by Justice Douglas.
231. Id. at 149 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment).
232. Id. at 146-47 (White, J., concurring).
233. Id. at 148 (Blackmun & Powell, JJ., concurring).
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balance between the essentially public accountability and the de-
sired private control of the media. 4
In Writers Guild, the court made a division between defendants in
order to analyze the state action issue. The first group, the private defend-
ants, consisted of the three networks and the NAB. As to these defendants,
the court stated that the right and the duty to make broadcasting decisions
reside with the individual licensees. 235 Thus, a network decision to adopt an
FVH policy would be constitutional, even if it involved state action, if it was
an "independent" decision.236 The court also held that this principle would
control a situation where the government "influenced" licensee action but
the licensee decision was made independent of that influence. 237 In the
instant case, however, the court found that governmental action went be-
yond mere influence and constituted governmental pressure. 238
The court found that the series of steps taken by FCC Chairman Wiley
were "designed to bring Commission pressure to bear on the industry. ,239
234. 412 U.S. at 120 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
235. 423 F. Supp. at 1134. "The right and the duty to make independent and final decisions
as to who shall and shall not get access to the media resides not with the networks (except in
their capacity as owners of local stations), not with the NAB, not with the FCC, not with the
screen writers, director or actors, not with Norman Lear or Tandem Productions and not with
this or any other court. The constitutionality of the broadcasting system depends on the
conclusion that the right and duty to make these decisions reside in hundreds of different
licensees." Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1135. In dictum, the court addressed plaintiffs' contention that government
influence was a "sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the
regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself."
Id. at 1135 (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). The court
refused to accept this contention on two grounds: first, mere FCC influence was not the type of
"highly offensive conduct" (sex or racial discrimination) that would permit a less exacting state
action standard; second, the importance of preserving a private sector free from the constitu-
tional requirements applicable to government institutions militated against a state action finding
for mere influence. 423 F. Supp. at 1135-38. But the court went on to hold that "even if
governmental encouragement were sufficient to make out a state action showing in this context,
there would be no First Amendment violation. . . .If the licensee has in good faith adopted a
policy which it reasonably believes to conform with the public interest and applicable regula-
tions and if it has adopted it not because of government pressure, but because it believes it to be
wise policy, the First Amendment not only permits the decision, but secures it from judicial
restraint." Id. at 1140.
238. The court held that FCC actions in this case constituted governmental pressure
sufficient to establish state action. Id. at 1140-42. For a discussion of the state action concept as
applied to the government defendants, see notes 261-75 and accompanying text infra.
239. 423 F. Supp. at 1097. The court noted, however, that Wiley was responding reluctantly
to political pressure created by the House Report. Id. at 1096; see note 91 and accompanying
text supra. "Chairman Wiley's reluctance to enter into the field had not been caused by a lack
of concern for the problem [of the effects of violence and other questionable programming on
children] as a private citizen and parent. Instead it stemmed from a deep belief that constituion-
al, statutory and prudential considerations dictated that government had no proper role to
play." Id. at 1096. The court made several other references to Wiley's personal concern about
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Essentially the theory was that since the FCC was required to
determine whether relicensing of a station was in the "public
interest" it could identify in advance those matters which it con-
sidered to be Qutside of the public interest. Thus, Commission
statements clothed in the language of "public interest" would warn
broadcasters of consequences in the relicensing process. Moreov-
er, although the Commission could not directly censor pro-
gramming content, it could achieve the same result by "public
interest" jawboning.240
This "jawboning" took the form of speeches such as the one Wiley made in
Chicago to the Illinois Broadcasters Association. In this speech Chairman
Wiley concentrated on the question of violence and obscenity on television,
emphasizing the effect that such programming might have on children.
Broadcasters were reminded of their "public accountability" and "special
responsibilities as licensees."241 Wiley stated, " 'I am frankly optimistic
that the combined effect of government encouragement and enlightened
self-regulation will bring about constructive change in this very important
aspect of public service.' "242 The court found that the meaning of this
speech was unmistakable and noted that the industry press was quick to pick
it up.
243
Wiley and his staff had numberous meetings with network officials. 
244
During one of these meetings Wiley was interviewed over the telephone by
Les Brown, a reporter for the New York Times. In response to questions
Commission action: "Chairman Wiley was convinced that formal Commission action was
unwise policy. Moreover he believed that the staff proposals for formal Commission action
presented severe First Amendment and section 326 problems. Instead of moving ahead with
formal proceedings, he decided to do something 'more quick and more dramatic.' Despite grave
reservations about the viability of formal Commission actions, Wiley permitted the staff to
continue working on proposed notices of rulemaking and inquiry." Id. at 1097 (footnotes
omitted). At a meeting with the FCC staff 'and the Washington vice-presidents of ABC, CBS,
and NBC, Chairman Wiley proposed that each network issue a statement of policy on violence
and obscenity, that the policy include cautionary warnings, and that the programs requiring
warnings be scheduled later in the evening. Id. at 1099. The court stated that Wiley made it
clear that if the networks were unable to agree on an approach along these general lines, he
would urge the Commission to take alternative action. Id. The court commented that "[t]his is
not to say that Wiley had somehow changed his mind about the constitutionality of formal
Commission action. He explicitly reaffirmed his doubts about its propriety." Id.
240. Id. at 1097.
241. Id. at 1098.
242. Id. (quoting Chairman Wiley).
243. Id. BROADCASTING, the major industry journal, stated that: "Chairman Wiley, who is
loathe to delve into the area of program content under any conditions, appeared in his Illinois
speech to be embarking on the same course that proved successful in connection with children's
television progamming. A tough speech in Atlanta in May resulted several months later in the
bind of self-regulation. . . ... Id. (quoting BROADCASTING, Oct. 21, 1974, at 41). Witnesses at
the trial "uniformly testified that network executives and FCC officials religiously read the
trade press." 423 F. Supp. at 1098.
244. See, e.g., id. at 1098-99, 1101, 1103.
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from Brown, Chairman Wiley indicated that public hearings on the question
of sex and violence on television were always a possibility, and one that the
networks would not like.245 The next day an article appeared in the New
York Times stating "that Wiley 'made no secret of the fact that he might use
the prospect of hearings as negotiating leverage to spur the networks into
adopting policies on their own to protect the young from adult-oriented
programs.' "246
By yielding to this pressure, the networks did not exercise the kind of
independent decisionmaking required by the First Amendment.247 The net-
work adoption of the FVH policy violated the First Amendment, then, not
because government pressure was present, but because the networks did not
fulfill their fiduciary duty to program independently and in the public
interest.248 A second First Amendment violation resulted from the networks'
agreement to compromise the right of licensees to make independent pro-
gramming decisions.249 The court found that the FVH amendment to the
NAB Television Code was a device used to undermine such independent
decisionmaking.350 The joint actions of the government and the networks
constituted impermissible state action.
The state action in this case, like that in NAACP v. Alabama,
25 1
consisted of a combination of private and governmental action. The court
found that the combination of "[b]roadcasters . . . join[ing] forces with
governmental officials [brought] about industry-wide adherence to a govern-
ment plan to suppress offensive materials in the early evening hours
... 2 In NAACP the Court noted that an abridgment of rights may
follow "from varied forms of governmental action ' 253 including those in
245. Id. at 1105.
246. Id. (quoting Brown, Head of F.C.C. Weighing Hearings on T.V. Violence, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 18, 1974, at 91, col. 3).
The court stated that Wiley was quite concerned about the article, both because he thought
it imported a threatening tone to his remarks that he did not believe was present and because it
would appear that he was deliberately using the press to put additional public pressure on the
networks. 423 F. Supp. at 1105. The article was received as an exhibit at trial exclusively as
evidence of the fact that the statements in the article were made and were read and discussed by
the defendants. Id. at 1105 n.53.
247. Id. at 1140.
248. Id. at 1143.
249. Id.
250. Id. "[Tihe First Amendment is not concerned with what broadcasters decide to
program; it rather requires that the decision as to what should be broadcast be independently
arrived at by the licensee. If the licensee has in good faith adopted a policy which it reasonably
believes to conform with the public interest and applicable regulations and if it has adopted it
not because of government pressure, but because it believes it to be wise policy, the First
Amendment not only permits the decision, but secures it from judicial restraint." Id. at 1140.
251. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
252. 423 F. Supp. at 1145.
253. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958).
Fall 1977] FAMILY VIEWING HOUR
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
which the state has taken no direct action. 4 In the FVH case it was likewise
observed that direct action in the form of formal regulation was not required
for a First Amendment violation: "[N]othing whatever turns upon whether
governmental abridgments of First Amendment rights are achieved through
formal regulation or backroom bludgeoning.' '255 In NAACP the Court
stated that the "interplay of governmental and private action" was the
"crucial factor ' 25 6 because "it is only after the initial exertion of state
power . . . that private action takes hold. '257 In the FVH case the initial
exertion of state power took the form of Wiley's "suggestions" that the
industry undertake self-regulation; the combined network-NAB adoption of
the FVH amendment that resulted thus became state action under the
NAACP formulation. Only "by sifting facts and weighing circum-
stances" 258 could the conduct of Wiley in the network-NAB adoption of the
FVH policy be "attributed its true significance. "259 The court concluded
that:
[T]he Commission's pressure in this case was persistent, pro-
nounced, and unmistakable. Chairman Wiley's actions were the
direct cause of the implementation of the family viewing policy:
were it not for the pressure he exerted, it would not have been
adopted by any of the networks nor by the NAB. The threat of
regulatory action was not only a substantial factor leading to its
adoption but a crucial, necessary, and indispensable cause.260
As to the second group of defendants, the government defendants, 261
governmental involvement in the development and implementation of the
FVH amendment to the NAB Television Code was necessary to the court's
finding that First Amendment rights were violated. The court found such
governmental involvement in the actions of Chairman Wiley. "Chairman
Wiley admitted at trial that all of his actions throughout the campaign were
made in his official capacity as Chairman of the FCC. "262 Therefore, when
Chairman Wiley made speeches before trade associations and met on vari-
ous occasions with representatives of the networks and the NAB, his official
actions in pressuring private network officials to adopt a FVH policy were
imputed to the federal government. The court found that Chairman Wiley
"threatened the industry with regulatory action if it did not adopt the
essence of his scheduling proposals."263
254. Id. See text accompanying notes 175-79 supra.
255. 423 F. Supp. at 1142.
256. 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
257. Id. (emphasis added).
258. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
259. Id.
260. 423 F. Supp. at 1094 (emphasis added).
261. See note 113 supra.
262. 423 F. Supp. at 1140.
263. Id. at 1094.
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[T]he Commission has no right to accompany its suggestions with
vague or explicit threats of regulatory action should broadcasters
consider and reject them . . . Particularly when Commissioners
make recommendations in areas where formal regulation would be
questionable, it is vital that any suggestion of pressure or the
appearance of pressure be scrupulously avoided.2
The court then held that Commission actions impermissibly compromised
licensee independence by pressuring the networks to adopt the FVH policy
and by participating "in a conspiracy to usurp licensee independence
through the vehicle of the NAB.' 265
In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis266 the Court found that the regulatory
scheme enforced by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board and the board's
allocation of licenses was not in itself enough to attribute to the state the
racially discriminatory policies of Moose Lodge, a private club. Similary, in
Writers Guild the regulatory scheme imposed by the Communications Act
and FCC allocation of broadcast licenses alone would not be sufficient to
find state action in broadcaster adoption of the FVH policy. In Moose
Lodge, however, the Court emphasized the "symbiotic relationship" 267
found in Burton between the restaurant owner and the public parking
facility "where the private lessee obtained the benefit of locating in a
building owned by the state-created parking authority, and the parking
authority was enabled to carry out its primary public purpose of furnishing
parking space ... ." Chairman Wiley was concerned that any direct
action by the FCC in the area of program content would be unconstitutional;
he needed the cooperation of the networks in order to meet congressional
demands for action in this area of programming. The networks, being
sensitive to the FCC licensing power, implemented "self-regulation"
through the NAB Code Amendment, thereby enabling Wiley to carry out his
primary objective: the implementation of a FVH policy through industry
self-regulation.
Moose Lodge found state action based upon the state's enforcement of
the discriminatory membership rules of the private club. In Moose Lodge
this "sanctioning" occured through the Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board's regulation that required all private clubs licensed by the Board
to adhere to their constitution and bylaws. In the case of Moose Lodge, this
meant adherence to a racially discriminatory policy and constituted state
action. In Wfriters Guild, although the state action was not in the form of a
formal FCC regulation, the FCC nevertheless, through the informal actions
264. Id. at 1150.
265. Id. at 1151.
266. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
267. Id. at 175.
268. Id. (emphasis added).
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of its Chairman, in effect "sanctioned" broadcaster adoption of the FVH
policy. Through his "campaign" Chairman Wiley made it quite clear that
he was encouraging and approving broadcaster adoption of such a policy.
Notwithstanding the fact that no formal regulation of the FCC was involved
in approving the adoption of the FVH policy, the informal power of the FCC
that arose from its renewal of broadcaster's licenses under the elusive public
interest standard was implicit throughout.
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 269 the test applied by the Court
was whether there was a "sufficiently close nexus between the State and the
challenged action so that the action of the latter [could] be fairly treated as
that of the State itself.''270 The Court noted that the private utility was
heavily regulated by the state and enjoyed quasi-monopoly status with
respect to its service area, but these factors were not decisive in considering
whether Metropolitan's termination of service constituted state action.271 In
finding that the requisite "sufficiently close nexus" 272 did not exist in this
case, the Court rejected the argument that because the tariff that included
the termination provision had been filed with the state utility commission,
the commission approved or sanctioned the practice and thereby transmuted
it into state action.
In CBS v. Democratic National Committee273 the Court explained that
the process of balancing the First Amendment interests involved in broad-
casting had to be undertaken within the framework of the regulatory
scheme. 274 CBS, like the private utility company in Jackson, was subject to
extensive governmental regulation, but this alone did not make the practice
of a radio or television broadcaster in refusing to sell editorial advertising
time to various groups attributable to the government. In CBS it was argued
that because of the licensing of the broadcaster and the general regulatory
scheme under which it operated, the FCC had, in effect, approved the
challenged policy and thereby transmuted it into state action. In both
Jackson and CBS, the distinguishing factor was that the challenged
policies, regardless of the extent to which they had been sanctioned or
approved by virtue of the governmental regulatory scheme, were initiated by
the private entity and not by the government; whatever "approval" fol-
lowed was, therefore, insufficient to make the conduct attributable to the
state. In contrast, the impetus for the FVH policy was governmental.
269. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
270. Id. at 351.
271. Id. at 351-52.
272. Id. at 351.
273. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
274. Id. at 102.
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Here there is not mere inaction; the Commission itself has partici-
pated in an unprecedented joint venture, a transaction in which it
has joined with the most powerful forces in broadcasting to permit
a national board to dictate what may be heard, to implement a
policy developed and conceived by government.275
Wiley initiated the discussions that eventually led to adoption of the FVH.
In this case, therefore, the activities initiated by Chairman Wiley in his
official capacity on behalf of the FCC constituted sufficient governmental
involvement in essentially private acts to satisfy the state action require-
ment.
C. Prohibitions Against Prior Restraints
A prior restraint is an official restriction imposed upon speech or other
forms of expression in advance of communciation, as opposed to a subse-
quent punishment that is imposed after the communication has been
made. 276 "The special vice of a prior restraint is that communication will be
suppressed, either directly or by inducing excessive caution in the speaker,
before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the First Amend-
ment. "277 Although it is recognized that the prohibition against prior re-
straints is "not absolutely unlimited, "278 " [a]ny system of prior restraints of
expression comes [into court] bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity"27 9 and carries with it "a heavy burden of showing
justification for the imposition of such a restraint" that must be met by the
party desiring to restrain the speech.28 °
275. 423 F. Supp. at 1145 (emphasis added).
276. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 648 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as Emerson]. See also T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
503-07 (1970) [hereinafter cited as FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION]. In a long line of decisions, the
Supreme Court has considered certain official actions and identified them as prior restraints.
See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969); Staub v. City of
Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290,293-94 (1951); Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 161-62 (1939); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-15 (1931). Prior
restraints may take a variety of forms, with officials exercising control over different kinds of
public spaces under the authority of particular statutes. "All [prior restraints found by the
Court], however,. . . [have given] public officials the power to deny use of a forum in advance
of actual expression." Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975).
277. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390
(1973).
278. "No one would question but that a government might prevent. . . publication of the
sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops. On similar grounds, the
primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications. The security
of community life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow
by force of orderly government." Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
279. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 57, 70 (1963).
280. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). See also New
York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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Prior restraints have historically been viewed as preventing communi-
cation from occurring at all, 281 but a system need not effect total suppression
in order to create a prior restraint.282 In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of
Dallas,283 a Dallas ordinance established a nine-member Motion Picture
Classifications Board and required that prior to showing a film the exhibitor
had to file a plot summary and a proposed classification of the film with the
Board. Films were then classified by the Board as "suitable for young
persons" or "not suitable for young persons. ,28 If a film was classified as
"not suitable" then an exhibitor was required to be specially licensed to
show the film.2 85 The ordinance was enforced chiefly by subjecting the
exhibitor to a misdemeanor penalty. The exhibitor could be fined up to $200
for exhibiting a film that was classified as "not suitable for young persons"
without advertisements clearly stating its classification or without the clas-
sification being clearly posted, for exhibiting a "suitable" and a "not
suitable" film on the same program, for knowingly admitting a youth under
age 16 to a "not suitable" film without his guardian or spouse accompany-
ing him, for making any false or misleading statement in submitting a film
for classification, or for exhibiting a "not suitable" film without having a
valid license for doing so. 286 After observing that the evils attendant to prior
restraints were "not rendered less objectional because the regulation of
expression is one of classification rather than direct suppression," the Court
held that the system created a prior restraint.2 87 Likewise, in Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan,288 Rhode Island had established a commission that was
charged with educating the public regarding any material classified as
"manifestly tending to the corruption of the youth." The commission did
not regulate or suppress these materials, but, rather, they coerced, per-
suaded, and intimidated with the objective of suppressing, and succeeded in
doing so.2 89 The Court held that these activities were an unconstitutional
prior restraint.29 Similarly, in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,29'
the directors of a municipal theater rejected an application to present the
musical "Hair" in the theater.292 Although none of the directors of the
theatre had either seen the play or read the script, they had heard from
281. Emerson, supra note 276, at 648.
282. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975).
283. 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
284. Id. at 678.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 680.
287. Id. at 688-89.
288. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
289. Id. at 59, 66-67.
290. Id. at 64.
291. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
292. Id. at 548.
[Vol. 4
outside reports that the play, as produced in other places, involved nudity
and obscenity on stage. 291 Despite the fact that there was no conflicting
engagement scheduled for the theater, the directors classified the production
as not "in the best interest of the community ' ' 294 and thereby rejected
Southeastern's application to use the theater. The Court considered the
classification involved in the director's decision to be important and likened
it to the prior restraint found in Interstate Circuit and Bantam Books.295
Again, the fact that a classificatory decision did not have the effect of total
suppression did not prevent a finding of prior restraint. Moreover, it was
irrelevant that speech restrained in one forum could be presented in another
because "[o]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in
appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some
other place.' '296 In Southeastern, the Court stated that it was of "no
consequence" that some other privately owned theater in the city could have
been used for the production; even if another forum is available, that fact
alone does not justify an otherwise impermissible prior restraint.297
The FVH policy at issue in Writers Guild contained classificatory
elements similar to those previously found objectionable by the Supreme
Court. The FVH amendment to the NAB code gave the Television Code
Review Board the "power to control the early evening programming of
most television stations in the United States." 298 Like the classification of
films in Interstate, as "suitable" or "not suitable" for young persons, the
Television Code Review Board and network censors classified programs to
determine which ones were "inappropriate for viewing by a general family
audience. ' ' 21 The FVH policy, like the policy in Bantam Books, had the
objective of suppressing protected speech by coercion, persuasion, and
intimidation, and was effective in suppressing protected speech during the
FVH period. 300 The classificatory aspects and the less than total suppression
resulting from the implementation of this policy were, however, sufficient
to establish an unconstitutional prior restraint, which was objectionable
because it restrained protected speech from being presented in the television
forum during the FVH period. The restraint did not become less objection-
able merely because it was less than total or because the same speech could
have been presented in the television forum during a time other than the
FVH period.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 556 n.8.
296. Id. at 556 (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)).
297. 420 U.S. at 556.
298. 423 F. Supp. at 1143.
299. Id. at 1072.
300. See id. at 1123-26.
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The FVH policy was also an unconstitutional prior restraint because it
lacked adequate procedural safeguards. A court need not decide whether the
standard for establishing a prior restraint is sufficiently precise or substan-
tially correct if the procedure for implementing the restraint is defective. In
Southeastern, for example, the Court based its holding on the "procedural
shortcomings" 30 1 of the system under which the musical was restrained.
Whatever the reasons may have been for the board's exclusion of
the musical, it could not escape the obligation to afford appropriate
procedural safeguards . . . .The standard, whatever it may be,
must be implemented under a system that assures prompt judicial
review with a minimum restriction of First Amendment rights
necessary under the circumstances. °2
In Freedman v. Maryland,303 the Court was confronted by a challenge
to the constitutionality of a Maryland motion picture censorship statute. The
theater owner challenging the statute had been convicted for exhibiting a
film without first submitting the film to the State Board of Censors. 304 The
Court held that "a noncriminal process which requires the prior submission
. . .to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under
procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship
system.' '35 In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, ° the Court
addressed the distinguishing characteristics of a live stage production. "By
its nature, theater usually is the acting out-or singing out-of the written
word, and frequently mixes speech with live action or conduct. ' 30 7 The
Court expressly reaffirmed the holding of Freedman and set forth three
procedural safeguards necessary to protect this medium of expression.
[A] system of prior restraint runs afoul of the First Amendment if it
lacks certain safeguards: First, the burden of instituting judicial
proceedings, and of proving that the material is unprotected, must
rest on the censor. Second, any restraint prior to judicial review
can be imposed only for a specified brief period and only for the
purpose of preserving the status quo. Third, a prompt final judicial
determination must be assured.30
301. 420 U.S. at 562.
302. Id.
303. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
304. Id. at 52-53. The state conceded that the picture did not violate the statutory standards
and would have received a license if it had been properly submitted.
305. Id. at 58.
306. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
307. Id. at 557-58.
308. Id. at 560. The Freedman Court essentially set forth the same procedural safeguards
using a somewhat different organization. The test in Freedman consisted of two basic safe-
guards: the burden of proving the film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor and
only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding is sufficient to impose a valid final
restraint. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). In discussing the second safeguard,
the Court recognized that the state may require advance submission of all films in order to
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Testimony at trial established that, at best, the FVH policy was applied
under an informal system of discussion, decision, and appeal to higher
levels of executives within the networks. 309 The court found that "the NAB
function[ed] as an effective enforcement mechanism [for the FVH provi-
sions of the NAB Code]. ' 310 In addition to creating a system that would
allow challenges from any source to be considered by the Code Authority,
the Code Authority itself undertook an extensive monitoring process.
311
This "monitoring [process was] 'complicated by the fact that the Television
Code Review Board [had] not established criteria designed to help deter-
mine whether or not a program, or part thereof, . . . conform[ed] to the
"family viewing concept."' "312 "The definition of family viewing propri-
ety thus turned on interaction between the networks, other broadcasters, and
the Code Authority, with the touchstone being what [Code Authority
Director] Helffrich and ultimately the Code Board would think was appro-
priate." 313 Such a scheme "runs afoul of the First Amendment" because it
lacks the required procedural safeguards. First, the burden of proving that
the material was protected and of appealing decisions under the FVH policy
was on the producers, directors, and writers, rather than on the censors.
314
Second, the restraint was for an indefinite period of time that altered the
status quo, rather than for a brief period that preserved the status quo
pending judicial review. 315 Third, there was no assurance of a final judicial
determination of any kind, prompt or otherwise.
proceed effectively to bar all showings of unprotected films. In accommodating this state
interest consistent with the second safeguard, the Court established three requirements. First,
the exhibitor must be assured by statute or authoritative judicial construction that within a
specified brief period the censor will either issue a license or go to court to restrain the showing
of the film. Second, any restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial determination on the
merits must similarly be limited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period
compatible with sound judicial resolution. Third, the procedure must also assure a prompt final
judicial decision, to minimize the deterrent effect of an interim and possibly erroneous denial of
a license. Id. at 58-59.
309. Plaintiffs' Opening Post-Trial Brief at 84, Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v.
FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976). This brief cited testimony of Richard Kirschner (at
Reporter's Transcript 3127-30) and Norman Lear (at Reporter's Transcript 2461-62, 2527-28).
310. 423 F. Supp. at 1123. For a detailed explanation of the procedures for the enforcement
of the FVH discussed at the October 6-8, 1975 meeting of the Code Board, see id. at 1124.
311. Id. at 1124.
312. Id. (quoting an Aug. 25, 1975 memorandum from Code Authority Director Helffrich).
313. Id. at 1124.
314. "If the challenger disagrees with the response of the network or station, the [NAB]
Code Authority Director, upon receipt of a request from the challenger will review the matter.
If the [NAB] Code Authority Director agrees with the challenger [to a prime time family
viewing program], the network or station may seek review of the issue by the Programs
Standard Committee of the Board." Id.
315. Mr. Lear testified that "I made the show because I believed in it. . .and then had to
wait the weeks to find out if the show would ever be aired, would they ever pay for it, what
was going to happen." Id. at 1126.
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Both the substantive and procedural safeguards discussed are important
because freedom of speech, along with freedom of the press, is charac-
terized as a fundamental personal right and liberty, reflecting "the belief
that the exercise of the rights lies at the foundation of free government by
free men." 31 6 In cases where freedom of speech has been abridged, the
courts "weigh the circumstances and. . . appraise the substantiality of the
reasons advanced in support of the regulation" of the right to freedom of
expression.31 7 Since there is also a heavy presumption against the constitu-
tional validity of any system of prior restraints, the party desiring to restrain
the speech carries a heavy burden of justifying the imposition of the
restraining regulation. Writers Guild, however, is illustrative of a situation
in which a prior restraint was imposed without meeting the necessary burden
of justification. The Writers Guild defendants did not attempt to suggest
that the government policy was supported by sufficient evidence to over-
come the presumption against the constitutional validity of the restraint
imposed on protected speech by the FVH.31 8
Although the court in Writers Guild did not reach this issue, the
alleged harmful effects on youthful viewers is the rationale most frequently
asserted for the regulation of televised violence.
If parents could buy packaged psychological influences to
administer in regular doses to their children, I doubt that many
would deliberately select Western gunslingers, hopped-up
psychopaths, deranged sadists, slapstick buffoons and the like,
unless they entertained rather peculiar ambitions for their growing
offspring. Yet such examples of behavior are delivered in quantity,
with no direct charge, to millions of households daily. Harried
parents can easily turn off demanding children by turning on a
television set; as a result, today's youth is being raised on a heavy
dosage of televised aggression and violence.319
Conversely, a justification that has been asserted as a rationale for the
presentation of violence on television is the cathartic or abreaction hypothe-
sis. The basis of this hypothesis is that viewing aggressive scenes reduces
the aggressive drives of the viewer, that children get rid of hostility in an
innocuous way by watching violent television programs, and that this is a
harmless outlet for latent hostility and relieving pent-up aggression. It is
gradually becoming clear, however, that the bulk of the social scientific
evidence available does not lend support to the cathartic argument. 320 Some
316. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
317. Id.
318. 423 F. Supp. at 1149. See text accompanying note 159 supra.
319. Bandura, What TV Violence Can Do To Your Child, LooK, Oct. 22, 1963, at 46,
reprinted in VIOLENCE AND THE MASS MEDIA (0. Larsen ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Larsen].
320. Halloran, Television and Violence, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, Winter 1964-65, at 61,
reprinted in Larsen, supra note 319, at 143-54; M. Gunther, All That TV Violence: Is It Really
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of the studies that attempt to assess the effect of television violence on
children will be reviewed to evaluate the substantiality of these claims and
the validity of governmental regulation of program content to protect chil-
dren. 321
The study of the Media Task Force322 by the National Commission on
the Causes and Prevention of Violence (the Eisenhower Commission) found
that a high level of violence exists in television entertainment pro-
gramming. 323 Based on the work of sociologist William R. Catton and
communications expert George Gerbner, the Task Force concluded that
television conveys "[tihe overall impression . . . that violence, employed
as a means of conflict resolution or acquisition of personal goals, is a
predominant characteristic of life. Cooperation, compromise, debate and
other non-violent means of conflict resolution are notable for their relative
lac [sic] of prominence." 324 Although the Media Task Force found less than
adequate support for the proposition that television violence will cause
viewers to act aggressively toward other people, it did issue the following
summary statement: "While the evidence is incomplete, we can. . . assert
the probability that mass media portrayals of violence are one major contrib-
utory factor which must be considered in attempts to explain the many forms
of violent behavior that mark American society today." 32 Dr. Gerbner326
has concluded that three years of tests he directed have established
that heavy television watchers 32 7 tend to exaggerate and overestimate the
danger of violence in their own lives, creating what he calls a "mean-world
syndrome." 3 2' He reports that for children " 'the pattern is exactly the
So Harmful?, pt. 2, TV GUIDE, Nov. 13, 1976, at 38 [hereinafter cited as M. Gunther, pt. 2];
Wilson, Violence, Pornography and Social Science, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Winter 1971, at 45,
51-52 [hereinafter cited as Wilson].
321. For a more complete and extensive review of the literature in this area, see generally
Note, Violence On Television, 6 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 303, 303-08 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Violence On Television]; Note, The Regulation of Televised Violence, 26 STAN. L. REV.
1291, 1291-1303, 1323-25 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Regulation of Televised Violence]; Wilson,
supra note 320, at 45.
322. TASK FORCE ON MASS MEDIA AND VIOLENCE, 11 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, MASS MEDIA AND VIOLENCE (1969) (staff report)
[hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE].
323. Violence On Television, supra note 321, at 304.
324. TASK FORCE, supra note 322, at 336.
325. Id. at 375.
326. See note 347 infra.
327. "Heavy viewing" was defined as four or more hours per day. M. Gunther, pt. 2,
supra note 320, at 40.
328. Waters, What TV Does to Kids, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 21, 1977, at 69 [hereinafter cited as
Waters]. See also Gerbner & Gross, The Scary World of TV's Heavy Viewer, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY, April, 1976, at 41, 45, 89; Rothenberg, Effect of Television Violence on Youth, 234
J.A.M.A. 1044 (1975); O'Brien, Childhood Fear of Violence, San Francisco Examiner, March
2, 1977, at 20, col. 1.
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same, only more so, and that the prevailing message of TV is to generate
fear.' "329 It has also been asserted that children can acquire new techniques
of aggression merely by observing aggressive acts performed by filmed
cartoon characters and that aggressive behavior learned by observation can
be retained by children for as long as eight months. 330 More recently, on the
basis of numerous additional studies, it has been asserted that televised
violence can instigate viewers to acts of specific physical aggression and can
teach viewers a general aggressive strategy. 331 The National Citizens Com-
mittee for Broadcasting (NCCB) has called television a "college of criminal
instruction" and has cited several cases of apparent translation from screen
to real life.332
A 1972 report by the Surgeon General333 is perhaps the most exhaustive
study of the subject to date. The Surgeon General took the position that the
report indicates television violence does have an adverse effect on certain
members of our society and that the causal relationship between televised
violence and antisocial behavior is sufficient to warrant immediate action. 334
The Surgeon General's conclusions, however, have not gone unques-
tioned.335 More recent studies have produced contrary results. Dr. Stanley
Milgram, a professor of psychology at the City University of New York, has
been trying to find a connection between violence on television and violence
in the community. Stating "I personally find the prevalence of violence on
TV repugnant," he notes that thus far the evidence of a connection between
television violence and community violence has not been compelling. 336
One study has concluded that "television is unlikely to cause aggressive
behavior except perhaps 'in those few children who are emotionally dis-
turbed.' ,337 Other studies have produced results that show that televised
violence cannot instigate viewers to acts of specific physical aggression and
cannot teach viewers a general aggressive strategy. 338 Although the National
Citizens Committee for Broadcasting (NCCB) examples of apparent transla-
tion from screen to real life would seem to suggest a direct cause-and-effect
329. Waters, supra note 328, at 69. See also M. Gunther, pt. 2, supra note 320, at 40.
330. Violence On Television, supra note 321, at 306 (citing TASK FORCE, supra note 322, at
399-400).
331. Regulation of Televised Violence, supra note 321, at 1293.
332. M. Gunther, pt. 2, supra note 320, at 37. See also Waters, supra note 328, at 67.
333. TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: A TECHNICAL REPORT TO THE SURGEON GENER-
AL'S SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1972).
334. See Note, The FCC As Fairy Godmother: Improving Children's Television, 21
U.C.L.A L. REV. 1290, 1297 n.39 (1974) [hereinafter cited.as FCC As Fairy Godmother].
335. See id. at nn. 82-84 and accompanying text supra.
336. M. Gunther, pt. 2, supra note 320, at 35.
337. Violence On Television, supra note 321, at 306 (quoting H. HIMMELWERT, A. Op-
PENHEIM, & P. VINCE, TELEVISION AND THE CHILD 20 (reprint of Chapters 1-4 of book of same
title published in 1958)).
338. Regulation of Televised Violence, supra note 321, at 1297 n.33.
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relationship, not all scientists have felt that the relationship has been proven,
even in cases of direct imitation. 339 Psychiatrist Melvin Heller and psycholo-
gist Samuel Polsky studied video violence for years with funds from ABC.
This included research projects aimed at determining what factors may bear
on a child's "inclination toward aggression" as well as attempting to
correlate violence on television to actual behavior. 4 In a study of 100
young men in prison for violent crimes, Heller and Polsky could not find a
single case in which television violence was a "causal" or "motivational"
factor in the young man's violent behavior; they did, however, find cases in
which a television show had affected the "style or technique" of a crime,
like those cases cited by the NCCB. But in all these cases, the young man
was already working himself up to a violent act; the television show merely
affected the form of an act that allegedly would have occurred anyway. 341
The laboratory experiments, however, have been qualified by the
experimentors themselves as well as by others.342 Bandura, for example, has
cautioned that the aggressive behavior found in his experiments was not
directed toward people. 343 Another qualification on the implications of the
experiments with respect to length of retention is the fact that the retained
responses were practiced at least once. Practicing immediately after obser-
vation in the experiment may distort the results of the study because in an
uncontrolled environment such practicing immediately after observation is
not likely to occur. 344
The number and variety of studies that have been conducted are
probably better evidence of the increasing public concern abut violence than
they are evidence of any sort of consensus on the effect of televised
violence. One major obstacle to finding significant results from the studies
undertaken to date has been an inability to duplicate the child's actual
339. M. Gunther, pt. 2, supra note 320, at 37.
340. BROADCASTING, March 22, 1976, at 109-11.
341. M. Gunther, pt. 2, supra note 320, at 37.
342. Violence On Television, supra note 321, at 307 (footnotes omitted).
343. Id. (citing TV GUIDE, Nov. 15, 1969, at 35).
344. Violence-on Television, supra note 321, at 307.
Other limitations on laboratory findings suggested are as follows: "the findings [may be]
purely hypothetical because they were based on studies conducted under highly specialized
conditions . . . mhe validity of drawing parallels between laboratory reactions to violent
stimuli and the effects of television violence [have been questioned] because the reactions were
measured in highly artificial ways such as preference for aggressive toys, verbal aggression
directed at toys or physical aggression directed at bobo dolls." Id. at 307 (footnote omitted)
(citing R. HARTLEY, THE IMPACT OF VIEWING AGRESSION: STUDIES AND PROBLEMS OF EXTRApo-
LATION 12 (1964)). It should also be noted, however, that "Dr. Hartley's study was written for
the industry-sponsored Joint Committee [for Research on Television and Children, formed in
1962] and was funded by CBS, casting some doubt on the absolute objectivity of her findings."
Violence on Television, supra note 321, at 307 n.29.
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experience with the television in his home and the many variables that
may effect his reactions. 345 Another obstacle in these studies is that "vio-
lence cannot be measured like potatoes." ' 6 While several "violence in-
dexes" have been developed, their developers often disagree sharply. 4
Although the studies have turned up a variety of interesting findings, the
conclusions continue to be varied and, due to their very nature, imprecise.
Such nebulous, contradictory, and inconclusive findings do not estab-
lish a substantial or compelling governmental interest to the degree neces-
sary to permit an invasion ofFirst Amendment freedoms. This conclusion is
reinforced by the Supreme Court's mandate that a system of prior restraints
comes into court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity. The inconsistent and inconclusive findings of studies conducted to
date on television sex and violence are insufficient to overcome this pre-
sumption and do not justfy infringement of First Amendment guarantees.
The Court's decisions have firmly established that mere public intolerance
or animosity cannot be the basis for abridgement of First Amendment
Constitutional freedoms.348 "[U]ndifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right of freedom of expres-
sion." 349
D. Vagueness and Overbreadth
1. Vagueness
"It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for
vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.'35 The doctrine of
vagueness concerns the uncertainty or ambiguity of the terms of a chal-
lenged statute and is important for several reasons. First, the law must give a
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited. Vague laws do not give fair warning and may trap the innocent.
345. Violence on Television, supra note 321, at 307.
346. M. Gunther, pt. 2, supra note 320, at 7.
347. M. Gunther, All That TV Violence: Why Do We Love/Hatelt?, pt. 1, TV GUIDE, Nov.
6, 1976, at 6 [hereinafter cited as M. Gunther, pt. 1].
One of the longest-running and best known indexes was developed by Professor George
Gerbner, dean of the Annenberg School of Communications at the University of Pennsylvania.
One week in the fall and one week in the spring are picked as samples and during the week 12 to
18 "coders" count the bits of violent material according to a complicated formula. From an
analysis of these findings Gerbner and his colleagues produce a "Violence Profile" issued once
a year. Gerbner's index, however, makes no distinction between humorous and serious depic-
tions of violence. Other indexes have criticized this failure to distinguish situational violence.
Id. at 7-8. See also Bergreen, How Do You Measure Violence, TV GUIDE, Nov. 5, 1977, at 6.
348. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971), and cases cited therein.
349. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,508 (1969).
350. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). See generally Note, The Void-
for-Vagueness Doctrine, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
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Second, in order to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, laws
must provide explicit standards for those who apply and enforce them.
Third, a vague statute can inhibit the exercise of First Amendment free-
doms. Statutory terms with uncertain meanings can lead persons to avoid the
boundaries of forbidden areas and thus have a chilling effect on speech, an
effect that would be avoided by explicit limitations on the scope of the
statute.351 "[S]tandards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the
area of free expression," 352 and the prohibition against vagueness applies
"with particular force in review of laws dealing with speech." 353 Not only
may a vague law harm an individual, but it may also harm society as a whole
due to the loss of free dissemination of ideas. The potential for self-
censorship that arises from vague statutes has been a central concern of
the Court, reflected by the fact that individuals have traditionally been
allowed to assert First Amendment vagueness claims of third parties. 354
Thus, defendants whose own speech was unprotected have been allowed to
challenge the constitutionality of a statute that either purported to prohibit
or arguably inhibited the protected speech of third parties. In non-speech
cases, however, the Court has usually insisted that a statute be evaluated in
the context of the conduct with which an individual is charged. 355 Recently,
however, the Court has limited the assertion of such claims to situations
where " 'men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its mean-
ing' "356 and the statute is not "readily subject to a narrowing construction
by the state courts." 357
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents,358 the Court addressed a provision
of New York's Education Law that made "treasonable or seditious" utter-
ances or acts by teachers grounds for dismissal from the public school
system. While an amendment to the statute defined "treasonable word or
351. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
360, 372 (1964); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). See also Note, The Chilling Effect
in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808 (1969).
352. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963). See also Note, The Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 75-85 (1960).
353. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610,620 (1976). See also Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147, 151 (1959); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509-10, 517-18 (1948).
354. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972). See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
355. United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 33 (1963).
356. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,607 (1973) (quoting Connally v. General Constr.
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). Vagueness claims may also be permitted in situations where the
punished activity does not fall squarely within the statute's proscriptions. See Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973).
357. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 490-91 (1965). See also United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 578-79 (1973).
358. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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act" and "seditious word or act" by reference to the New York Penal Law,
the court found that the possible scope of "seditious" utterances or acts was
virtually unlimited, and held that the statute was defective for vagueness.
359
Likewise, the Court in Interstate Circuit v. City of Dallas360 struck
down as unconstitutionally vague an ordinance classifying films as "not
suitable for young persons" if in describing or portraying criminal violence
or depravity or in describing or portraying nudity, promiscuity, or ex-
tramarital or abnormal sexual relations, it was likely to incite or encourage
delinquency or sexual promiscuity, or appeal to the prurient interest of
young persons.3 61 Justice Marshall stated:
[It is not] an answer to an argument that a particular regulation of
expression is vague to say that it was adopted for the salutary
purpose of protecting children. The permissible extent of vague-
ness is not directly proportional to, or a function of, the extent of
the power to regulate or control expression with respect to chil-
dren.362
On the same day that Interstate Circuit was decided, the Court upheld
a statute in Ginsberg v. New York3 63 that prohibited a person from
knowingly selling to a minor under the age of seventeen any picture that
depicted nudity in a manner defined in detail in the statute and that was
considered "harmful to minors" in that it " 'predominantly appeals to the
prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, . . . is patently offensive
to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to
what is suitable material for minors, and. . . is utterly without redeeming
social importance for minors.' "364 The Court in Ginsberg noted that the
"girlie" magazines involved in the sales were not obscene for adults 365 but
that " 'the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches
beyond the scope of its authority over adults.' ,366 The Court found two
interests that formed a rational basis for the legislature's determination to
limit the exposure of this material to minors. 367 First, parents, teachers, and
others primarily responsible for children's well-being were entitled to the
support of laws designed to help them discharge their responsibilities.
Second, the prohibition against sales to minors did not bar parents who
desired to do so from purchasing the magazines for their children. 368 The
359. Id. at 599-604.
360. 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
361. Id. at 681.
362. Id. at 689.
363. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
364. Id. at 633.
365. Id. at 634. See also id. at 635; see notes 150-55 and accompanying text supra.
366. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 170 (1944)) (footnote omitted).
367. 390 U.S. at 639.
368. Id.
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Court also noted the state's independent interest in the well-being of its
youth.369
The Court has thus recognized that the exercise of particular First
Amendment rights may fly in the face of the public interest in the health of
children.37 The Court has also acknowledged the existence of a special
societal interest in protecting children from sexually explicit materials. 371
These special interests may well be reinforced by the fact that a television
broadcast intrudes into the privacy of the home. The Court has held that the
individual's right of privacy is entitled to greater protection in his home than
the right may command outside of his home. 372 But the Court has also held
that an individual's right to possession of even obscene materials in his
home is protected.373 Although the right to privacy and the right to posses-
sion would seem to be in tension when applied to television broadcasts into
the home, the tension is relieved once an individual decides which right to
exercise.
These First Amendment guarantees presuppose, however, that the
individual making the choice is possessed of full capacity for individual
choice. 374 The obvious concern underlying the FVH policy is that children
are not possessed of the full capacity to exercise individual choice due to
their age. The policy is, however, misguided because the power of decision
as to what is "inappropriate for viewing by a general family audience" is
vested with the Code Board rather than with the parents. As the Court noted
in Ginsberg, the parents have primary responsibility for their children's
well-being. Although the interests of some parents in discharging that
responsibility may be supported by the FVH policy, the interests of other
parents may well be preempted by the policy. In Ginsberg the Court also
observed that "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that
the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of
their children is basic in the structure of our society." 375 The Court com-
mented favorably that "the prohibition against sales to minors does not bar
parents who so desire from purchasing the magazines for their children.' '376
The FVH policy, however, constitutes an absolute prohibition against par-
369. Id. at 640.
370. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169-70 (1944) (mentioning emotional excite-
ment and psychological or physical injury).
371. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638-39 (1968).
372. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737-38 (1970).
373. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969). "The right to receive information and
ideas, regardless of their social worth. . . is fundamental to our free society." Id. at 564.
374. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
375. 390 U.S. at 639.
376. Id. (footnote omitted).
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ents who desire their children to view the type of programs proscribed
during the FVH period.
The FVH policy's method of "protecting" children is also objection-
able because it is overprotective. Notwithstanding the Ginsberg recognition
of permissible protection exceeding the adult standard, the Court has held
that "only in relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances may govern-
ment bar public dissemination of protected materials to [children]., 377
Children may not be regarded as passive recipients of only that which the
state chooses to communicate and they may not be confined to only those
sentiments that are officially approved. 378 "In most circumstances, the
values protected by the First Amendment are no less applicable when
government seeks to control the flow of information to minors. "371 The fact
that the FVH was purportedly adopted to protect children from harmful
programming does not, therefore, provide a defense to its vagueness. The
same standards of precision of regulation apply whether the policy is
designed to protect children or adults.
Finally, it should be noted that a distinguishing feature of the statute
upheld in Ginsberg, which was lacking in the ordinance struck down in
Interstate Circuit, was that in Ginsberg the statute contained very specific
and detailed definitional sections. The Ginsberg statute provided a defini-
tional standard to its proscriptions, whereas the Interstate Circuit ordinance
did not, and was, therefore, unconstitutionally vague. Like the ordinance in
Interstate Circuit, and the unconstitutional system of classification that it
established, the FVH policy appears unconstitutionally vague. Its interpreta-
tion and enforcement depend on the subjective judgment of the individual
editor or censor applying the policy.38 When Richard Kirschner, CBS' Vice
President of Program Practices-Hollywood, was asked by Allan Bums, the
producer of "Rhoda," for his definition of "suitable for family viewing,"
Kirschner replied that the best definition he could give was the one offered
by Tom Stafford, CBS Vice President of Program Practices, " 'We'll know
it when we see it.' "381 Indeed, common sense dictates that what is deemed
377. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975).
378. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,511 (1969).
379. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214 (1975) (footnote omitted).
380. 423 F. Supp. at 1124-26.
381. Plainiffs' Opening Post-Trial Brief at 76 (citing Reporter's Transcript at 3520, Writ-
er's Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976)). This language is
very similar to that of Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184 (1964). Commenting on a French film called "Les Amants" and what constitutes hardcore
pornography, Justice Stewart wrote: "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of
material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could
never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture
involved in this case is not that." 378 U.S. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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"suitable for general family viewing" can have as many variations as there
are persons involved in making the determination. The FVH test of
"inappropriate for viewing by a general family audience" is itself virtually
unlimited and provides little in the way of guidance toward an ascertainable
standard as to what can and cannot be shown during the FVH period. The
statutory scheme struck down in Interstate Circuit382 included an exhaustive
list of definitions, whereas the FVH amendment to the NAB Television
Code includes no definitions by which network censors are to determine
what is and what is not "inappropriate for viewing by a general family
audience." 383 Such an absence of standards is at least as objectionable, if
not more so, than the vague standards that the Court struck down in
Interstate Circuit. Thus, even if the FVH were to survive other constitution-
al requirements, it would still fail under a vagueness analysis.
2. Overbreadth
When a statute or ordinance regulates too broadly, it sweeps within it
not only conduct that can be constitutionally prohibited but also conduct or
speech that is constitutionally protected. The focus of the overbreadth
concept is the possibility that the regulation may proscribe protected speech;
it is the challenged statute's potential for chilling such speech that is the
dispositive factor. 384 A statute need not be vague in order to be overbroad.
"A clear and precise enactment may nevertheless be 'overbroad' if in its
reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct.''385 "[The] Court has
repeatedly held that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms."
386
The Court strikes down overbroad statutes in order to defuse this
deterrent or chilling effect on protected activity. 387 "Broad prophylactic
382. 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
383. TELEVISION CODE, supra note 11, at 2-3. See text accompanying note 313 supra.
384. In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), the potential application of the
doctrine in the area of facial overbreadth was narrowed to exceptional cases in which the
overbreadth was both real and substantial, id. at 615, and in which a limiting construction had
not been or could not be placed on the statute by a state court, id. at 613. The Court recognized
the continuing importance of this doctrine for the protection of speech, however, by finding
that the case for striking down a law on overbreadth grounds was most weak when conduct
rather than pure speech was at stake. Id. at 615. The Broadrick concept was reiterated in Arnett
v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), in which the overbreadth claims of the plaintiffs were
dismissed because the challenged law was "not directed at speech as such, but at employee
behavior, including speech, which is detrimental to the efficiency of the employing agency."
Id. at 162. But cf. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
385. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972).
386. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
387. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521-22 (1972). See generally Note, The First Amend-
ment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844 (1970).
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rules in the area of free expression are suspect. Precision or regulation must
be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious free-
doms. "388 Precise regulation is essential; "[b]ecause First Amendment
freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the
area only with narrow specificity. " 389 A statute that burdens free speech
must thus employ the least restrictive alternative.
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substan-
tial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in
the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic pur-
pose.39o
It is the power of censorship inherent in an overbroad statute that
triggers this close examination by the judiciary. 391 In Keyishian v. Board of
Regents,392 for example, the Court held that the statutes involved were
impermissibly overbroad. By proscribing mere knowing membership in the
Communist Party without any showing of a specific intent to further unlaw-
ful aims, the statutes barred both association that could be proscribed and
association that could not be proscribed consistently with First Amend-
ment rights.393 In effect, the challenged statute swept so broadly that it
inhibited the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. 394
The FVH policy is overbroad as well as vague. Even if it were an
appropriate suppression of some speech, because of its overly broad charac-
ter the FVH policy is virtually certain to suppress other speech that would be
subject to constitutional protection. Such suppression of protected speech
due to a vague or overly broad proscription is unacceptable. As courts have
noted, the doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth are applied "quite rigor-
ously when a statute is directed at 'pure speech,' . . . or its expressive
content."
395
388. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (citations omitted).
389. Id. at 433.
390. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (footnote omitted). See generally Note,
The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844 (1970). See also United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
391. See Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948).
392. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
393. Id. at 609.
394. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). In that case the Court invalidated a statute
that required all public school teachers to file annual lists of every organization to which he or
she belonged or gave money during the previous five years. "The breadth of legislative
abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic
purpose." Id. at 488. "The statute's comprehensive interference with associational freedom
goes far beyond what might be justified in the exercise of the State's legitimate inquiry ....
Id. at 490 (footnote omitted).
395. Adamian v. Jacobsen, 523 F.2d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 1975).
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The defendants in Writers Guild contended that the only "harm" that
the plaintiffs suffered was that the FVH policy "caused them some irrita-
tion, [consumption of] time in discussions with network standards and
practices people and, perhaps, to expend a bit more creativity and ingenuity
in developing their product.", 396 The court stated, however, that "[t]he
plaintiffs have introduced evidence which shows harm not to show that harm
but to demonstrate the effectiveness of the NAB as a vehicle and to
demonstrate the vagueness of the family viewing policy." 391 Danny Arnold,
the producer of "Barney Miller," testified that following the inception of
the FVH the potential for reasoned compromise in his negotiations with
network censors was gone and that the atmosphere became one of "tension
and fear and pressure and self-censorship.'398 Larry Gelbart, a former co-
producer of "M*A*S*H," also testified that despite every effort to avoid it,
in the family viewing regime, "[tihere's a self-censorship that goes on no
matter how much you are trying to bolster the other guy. When you get a
call that attacks four out of ten ideas that you've submitted, you begin to see
any new ideas you're getting in light of that.,, 399 The court concluded that
"[s]ignificant self-censorship was evident. Characters were not developed,
themes were not explored, language was deleted-all in response to network
adherence to family viewing principles. "40
In this regard, David W. Rintels, President of Writers Guild of Ameri-
ca, West, and Larry Gelbart, former co-producer of "M*A*S*H" and a
member of the Writers Guild Board of Directors, testified as follows before
the Communications Subcommittee of the House of Representatives:
[T]here is explicit violence on TV. There is not explicit sex. We are
all at least somewhat clear about what we mean by violence. But by
sex on TV we mean so much, and the least of it seems to be the sex
act itself. Sex on television means, to a large extent, talk. Talk
about homesexuality, talk about abortion, talk about birth control
and prostitution and premarital or post-marital relationships. It
means jokes and discussions. It means a whole vast area of im-
portant human concern.
We want the right, not just in our own interest, but in the
country's, to be able to discuss mature themes on television, to
illuminate our concerns and yours. We think more freedom, free-
dom with responsibility, is the answer, instead of more censor-
ship.401
396. 423 F. Supp. at 1125.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 1126 (footnote omitted).
401. Hearings of the Subcomm. on Communications of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 140-41 (Aug. 17, 1976) (joint statement of Larry
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Not only do the concepts of vagueness and overbreadth often overlap in
the same case, but they also appear in conjunction with the doctrine of least
restrictive means. The requirement that a statute restricting speech must be
limited to the least restrictive means is an alternative formulation of the rule
that such a statute cannot be overbroad.4 2 Thus, statutes that impinge on the
right of free speech are subject to close judicial scrutiny to insure that they
are in fact narrowly tailored and that they further a substantial state inter-
est.4
03
A unique consideration when applying a least restrictive means analy-
sis to the broadcasting of sex and violence is that "[r]adio and television
. . .do not readily yield to an analysis that for constitutional purposes
separates children from the adult audience." 41 4 While magazine and book
sellers can be prohibited from selling to a person under a certain age and a
movie theatre owner can likewise be prohibited from admitting young
persons, the broadcast media enter directly into the living room.405 This
dimension of the problem is illustrated by the holding in Butler v. Michi-
gan4 6 that a statute that prohibited adult sales of books containing
immoral or lewd language or pictures tending to corrupt the morals of
children was unconstitutional. The Court found that the result of the statute
was to "reduce the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit
for children," 40 7 thereby curtailing an individual liberty that is one of the
"indispensable conditions for the maintenance and progress of a free soci-
ety."408 The Court reasoned that the state's use of its power to quarantine
reading material from adults in order to protect the innocence of children
was analogous to "burn[ing] the house to roast the pig." 4 9 Similarly, the
Gelbart and David Rintels with the unanimous endorsement of Writers Guild of America,
West's board of directors).
402. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 489 (1960); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147, 161 (1939).
403. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) ("the incidental restriction on
• .. First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest") (emphasis added); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (" 'justifies such
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger' ") (emphasis added) (quoting
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (1950)). See also Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972): "Any 'time, place and manner' restriction that selectively excludes
speakers from a public forum must survive careful judicial scrutiny to ensure that the exclusion
is the minimum necessary to further a significant government interest;" Karst, Equality as a
Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 28 (1975) (emphasis added).
404. Note, Morality and Broadcast Media: A Constitutional Analysis of FCC Regulatory
Practices, 84 HARV. L. REv. 664, 682 (1971).
405. Id. at 682-83.
406. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
407. Id. at 383.
408. Id. at 384.
409. Id. at 383.
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consequence of the FVH on the type of programming available to the adult
population during the FVH seems to be a severe and unacceptable solution
to the problem of minimizing adverse effects of television on children.
Several alternatives have been suggested to provide a method of pro-
tecting the programs that children watch without limiting adults to the same
choice of programs. In testimony before the Communications Subcommittee
of the House of Representatives, 410 Geoffrey Cowan, a specialist in com-
munications law, presented two means of government action that would be
less restrictive than the FVH policy but that would properly make and
enforce meaningful choices in what children could watch on television.
First, he suggested that government could adopt rules that would assure that
at least one program designed for children would be available to viewers at
all times during the hours between 7:00 and 9:00 p.m. Cowan explained that
the government could require each broadcaster to air a minimum number of
hours of prime-time programming specifically designed for a younger audi-
ence. The rule would be written in such a way that there would be at least
one children's show available each night between the hours of 7:00 and 9:00
p.m.
Another method of increasing the volume of children's programming
that Cowan feels would present even fewer constitutional problems, but
would be more strenuously resisted by the commercial television industry is
to create a non-commercial Children's Television Network that would
utilize channels now assigned to commercial users. Under this plan the
FCC, instead of just allocating frequencies, would set aside hours for the
presentation of non-commercial children's programming. Present licensees
would have their licenses renewed for their assigned frequency but only for
twenty-two or twenty-three hours per day. Private grants and governmental
subsidy could establish the Children's Television Network that would send
411shows to individual licensees.
Another approach that could be implemented are technological or
safety devices that are analogous to the safety caps on aspirin bottles or
safety locks on automobiles. Noting that a child of two or three has full
mastery of a television and can turn the switch on and watch and hear a
program designed for people at least ten times his age, Cowan suggested
that a lock on the on-off switch would be the easiest way to put control back
in the hands of the parents. A more technically complex type of lock would
be a lock on specific channels. This would allow a child to turn the set on or
off but restrict him to a certain station or stations. This device would be
410. Hearings of the Subcomm. on Communications of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 148 (Aug. 17, 1976) (testimony of Geoffrey Cowan).
411. For a more detailed discussion of this plan, see FCCAs Fairy Godmother, supra note
333, at 1332-38.
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particularly desirable if the government assured that a children's program
was always available on at least one network during the early evening
hours. 412
Although these alternatives do not purport to be an exhaustive list, they
certainly suggest that alternatives probably exist that are less severe in form
than the FVH policy but that address themselves to the same problems the
FVH was designed to remedy.
Conclusion
It is evident that the public is quite, concerned about the amount of
violence in our television diet. Recent manifestations of this concern in-
clude: an attempted week-long boycott sponsored by Build the Earth, a San
Francisco Bay area group, aimed at demonstrating the public's increasing
opposition to TV violence,413 a campaign against violent programming by
the National Parent Teacher Association (PTA),4  and a statement by the
president of the American Medical Association (AMA) that "TV violence
is both a mental health problem and an environmental issue" 415 as well as
an announcement that the AMA has asked ten major corporations to review
their policies about sponsoring excessively gory shows. 4 16 Among other
groups mobilized against violent programming are the NCCB, the National
Council of Churches, and the Southern Baptist Convention. 417 Advertising
agency J. Walter Thompson Co. has been encouraging its clients to avoid
placing advertising spots in shows perceived to be violent.41 8 J. Walter
Thompson believes that negative viewer reaction to violent programs takes
away from the advertisement's selling power, despite what the gross rating
points may indicate.41 9 While many groups are undoubtably concerned
about the amount of violence on television and its effect on our society,
412. Hearings of the Subcomm. on Communications of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 152 (Aug. 17, 1976) (testimony of Geoffrey Cowan).
413. San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 26, 1977, at 16, col. 1. See Advertisers Take Aim on TV
Violence, MEDIA DECISIONS, Feb. 1977, at 65 [hereinafter cited as MEDIA DECISIONS].
414. Waters, supra note 328, at 64. The 6.6 million member organization has begun a series
of regional forums designed to arouse public indignation over television carnage. If that
campaign is unsuccessful, the PTA is considering organizing station-license challenges and
national boycotts of products advertised on offending programs. Id.; MEDIA DECISIONS, supra
note 413, at 65; Torgerson, Violence Takes a Beating, TV GUIDE, June 4, 1977, at 6 [hereinafter
cited as Torgerson].
415. Waters, supra note 328, at 64. See also Henninger, Violence on Television, THE
NATIONAL OBSERVER, Feb. 22, 1977, at 12, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Henninger]; BROADCAST-
ING, July 5, 1976, at 35.
416. Waters, supra note 328, at 64; Torgerson, supra note 414, at 6.
417. Henninger, supra note 415, at 12, col. 1.
418. BROADCASTING, Aug. 30, 1976, at 24; MEDIA DECISIONS, supra note 413, at 66.
419. BROADCASTING, Oct. 18, 1976, at 44; BROADCASTING, Aug. 30, 1974, at 24; MEDIA
DECISIONS, supra note 413, at 66.
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"[c]ivil libertarians have always argued that the significance of the First
Amendment is that it protects even the least attractive forms of expression-
and that includes. . . portrayals of violence. However, the public's right to
protect its common good is always in tension with an absolutist intrepreta-
tion of the First Amendment ..... 420
It is clear only that a variety of competing interests are involved in
considerations of what shall and shall not be broadcast: the right of access to
disseminate ideas, the right of the viewer to a well-balanced and diverse
programming diet, the right of an individual to privacy in his home-both to
receive and not to receive material that may be offensive to some, the
interest of society in protecting children from potentially harmful materials,
and the rights of the broadcasters to be free from government interference,
to name just a few. In light of these substantial and competing interests it is
important to bear in mind the reason speech is afforded constitutional
protection: "[It] is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas .. "421 Because of the high value
traditionally placed upon free expression and its interrelationship with a
democratic society,422 only a serious and compelling societal interest should
be permitted to override the First Amendment guarantee of free speech;423
even if a compelling interest should be established, the least restrictive
means of achieving this interest must be employed.
While the evidence does seem to support some correlation between
violence on television and aggressive behavior in some people, under some
circumstances, the question is whether or not this is the sort of compelling
governmental interest necessary to override a fundamental interest such as
that of freedom of expression. Until a more precise and substantial body of
evidence exists proving that televised violence affects a significant portion
of the population adversely, the government cannot and should not interfere
with or regulate broadcast content.
420. Wall, Violent Movies on TV Risk Censorship Move, L.A. Times, Jan. 2, 1977, Part
VIII, at 2, col. 1.
421. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
422. See text accompanying note 316 supra.
423. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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